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This thesis is concerned with Iraqi flags and national iconography from 1921 to 2017, a period of 
history covering the emergence of the Kingdom of Iraq under the League of Nations to the defeat 
of the Islamic State. During its existence, Iraq adopted seven national flags, perhaps the most 
modified flag of a nation-state during the preceding one-hundred years. Flags provide historians 
a unique opportunity to interact with symbols of state authority, communicating normative 
relationships like national identity and aspirational values such as goodness, sacrifice, and 
fertility. Vexillology is the auxiliary historical science concerned with flags and ensigns. Its allied 
field, heraldry, focuses on arms, official representations of families and states identified by a 
system of emblems. Considering its vexillology and heraldry, this thesis argues that Iraqi flags 
and iconography constitute an archive that reveals a national identity organized around an 
emphasis on ethnicity and transhistorical relationships.  
Iraq was drawn from diverse Ottoman provinces, and its ethnic composition was not 
monolithic. Enclosed within the boundaries of the young nation were Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, 
Armenians, and Assyrians; organizing them around a national identity was challenging. 
Subsequent Iraqi governments pursued piecemeal policies designed to incorporate ethno-
confessional minorities into the budding body politic. Iraqi flag design, or vexillography, 
changed as new regimes inherited fractious political situations following successful revolutions 
or coups. Frequently, political agendas corresponded with ethnicity; ideologies like Pan-Arabism 
prioritized primordial bonds above emphasis on ethnically neutral civic nationalism. Regimes 
attempting to smooth ethnic differences often struggled to make inroads with minorities. For 
example, the Free Officers’ vexillography under Abd al-Karim Qasim contained Kurdish 
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symbolism despite warring against Kurdish peshmerga during a protracted, nine-year 
insurgency. 
Contrarily, Iraqi governments often attempted to deemphasize ethnicity, attempting to 
base national identity around a metaphysical link to an imagined past. This often manifested in a 
presupposed connection to ancient Mesopotamia, present in the heraldry of Iraq under its 
Hashemite kings and later during the Free Officers’ rule. This transhistorical tendency allowed 
Iraqis to participate in an imagined community of Mesopotamian descendants. For example, the 
2005 Iraqi constitution’s preamble begins, “We, the people of Mesopotamia, the homeland of the 
apostles and prophets, resting place of the virtuous imams, cradle of civilization, crafters of 
writing, and home of numeration.”   By providing a metaphysically neutral space dedicated to 
self-conceptualization, Iraqi iconography supplied unlimited room for its citizens to dwell in 
imagination. Virtually all Iraqi regimes during this period contextualized their reigns along 
historical lines, permitting upstart governments instant connectivity with a socio-constructed 
past. 
The monograph contains three chapters corresponding to blocs of Iraqi vexillographic 
and heraldic history. Chapter 2 (1921-58) covers the Hashemite administration of Iraq after its 
establishment under the League of Nations. This period marked the entrance of two separate 
Iraqi flags accompanied by elaborate heraldry consistent with European conventions. Chapter 3 
(1959 – 2003) addresses revolutionary governments under the Free Officers and Ba’th Party, 
highlighting the varying degrees Iraqi vexillography shifted between civic and ethnic 
nationalism. Chapter 4 (2004-17) encompasses the latest period of Iraqi history, associated with 
the Iraq War and the ISIS insurgency. The most crucial national question of the twenty-first 
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century was the appropriate placement of Husseinian memory and on official representations of 
Iraqi authority.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 – Abd al-Karim Qasim (L) and Saddam Hussein (R). At various periods throughout 
the twentieth century, revolutionary Iraqi regimes were a source of apprehension in the United 




1 Time, April 13, 1959, accessed April 15, 2020, http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19590413,00.html. 
Time, May 13, 2002, accessed April 15, 2020, http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20020513,00.html.  
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 2. Introduction 
This chapter considers Iraqi national symbols under the Hashemites from 1921 to 1958. Though 
it maintains a vexillological and heraldic focus, philatelic and archeological sources were 
consulted. The first section addresses the evolution of the Iraqi flag under Hashemite authority, 
its transformation, and its relation to symbols within the Sharifian orbit. Though under British 
hegemony, Hashemite flags reflected a considerable attachment to the Arab Revolt, its 
foundational struggle against the Ottomans from 1916 to 1918. The second section addresses 
Iraqi heraldry, an expression of Hashemite authority amidst historicized symbolism. During this 
period, the kingdom tackled a fundamental question of nation-building: How aught a newborn 
polity, lacking any historical antecedence, communicate its identity? The closing case study 
examines early Iraqi postage stamps as official efforts to historicize its identity within an 
imagined pre-Islamic past, one of Babylonian lions and Sumerian deities.  
The King of Iraq, Faisal ibn Hussein al Hashemi, obtained his second crown on August 
23rd, 1921. The previous year, Faisal governed the short-lived Arab Kingdom of Syria, a realm 
that succumbed to colonial designs following the lopsided Franco-Syrian War in 1920. 2 His 
coronation was a modest affair, including 1500 subjects and British colonial administrators in his 
capital, Baghdad. 3  Like his ensuing administration, the ceremony was a triangulation of British 
and Arab symbolism. The Iraqi king wore a British-style military uniform, a woolen field tunic, 
and bespoke pith helmet. 4 The coronation, held in a flag-festooned courtyard, included a 
 
2 James L. Gelvin, Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1998, 51-137.  
3 Gertrude Bell to Hugh Bell, August 28, 1921, Gertrude Bell Archive, Newcastle, UK: Newcastle University, 
http://www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk/letter_details.php?letter_id=501. 




centralized dais overlaid with Persian carpets, tufted chairs, and an unpretentious throne for 
Faisal. To ensure the ritual implied imperial sponsorship, the British diplomat Percy Cox joined 
Faisal onstage sporting a splendid white uniform. Following evocation, perfunctory remarks, and 
salutations, the band played “God Save the King,” as the Iraqis wanted for a national anthem. 5   
 
 
Figure 2.1 – The coronation of Faisal I on August 23rd, 1921. 6  
 
 It was not preordained that Faisal would rule Iraq. He was a consensus candidate and a 
byproduct of post-World War I geopolitical anxieties. In 1920, the same year France devastated 
 
5 Gertrude Bell to Hugh Bell, August 28, 1921.  
6 “King Faisal I – First Issue, 1927 & 1932,” Rezonville. 
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its Syrian opposition, London faced stiff resistance in simultaneous sub-state conflicts. In 
neighboring Ireland, British troops clashed with nationalists in the Anglo-Irish War (1919-21) 
while simultaneously suppressing a virulent insurrection in southern Iraq. The campaign killed 
numerous civilians, necessitated the deployment of thousands of reinforcements, and compelled 
David Lloyd George to restructure the administration of Mandatory Iraq. 7 Since Faisal enjoyed 
the confidence of prominent diplomatic officers, under the provisions of the Cairo Conference in 
1921 he would rule in Baghdad. 8 The arrangement, or “Sharifian Solution,” created Hashemite 
monarchies under a British umbrella throughout the post-Ottoman Middle East. The blueprint 
established kingdoms for three of Sharif Hussein’s sons, transforming longstanding vilayets into 
newborn polities dependent upon London. Therefore, the nexus of French colonial aspirations 
and a destabilized security situation permitted the installation of Faisal ibn Hussein in 1921 as 
the first king of Iraq.  
Iraqi national iconography during its Hashemite period (1921-58) reflected a confluence 
of administrative authorities. The Hashemites retained the ability to adopt national symbols in 
preparation for its eventual independence and membership in the League of Nations. Hence, 
detachment from British hegemony became the lodestar of Hashemite policy from 1921 onward, 
necessitating a vision of Iraqi distinctiveness. Iraqi vexillology maintained an allegiance to the 
Arab Revolt, while its national arms communicated a message of maturity and singularity 
befitting an independent power. If its national iconography was a discourse in Iraqi identity, the 
period of 1921 to 1958 represented the conversation’s opening position. While Iraq did not exist 
prior to 1921, the roots of Iraqi national iconography predated the Cairo Conference. Symbols of 
 
7 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003), 8. 
8 Report on Middle East Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem, London: British Colonial Office, 1921.    
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Hashemite authority represented a version of Iraqi identity subsequent regimes dissented against. 
At a minimum, the Iraqi monarchy and their British sponsors had a hand in defining what 
constituted Iraqi distinctiveness and what was alien.  
 
Arab Revolt Flag Vexillology (1916 – 25)  
Like many countries, Iraq’s national flag was battle-born. It evolved from the Arab Revolt flag 
(1916-18), a banner which often accompanied mounted rebel commanders during the conflict 
and marked captured Ottoman territory. 9 It was a broad standard, boasting a 2:3 aspect ratio and 
appeared somewhat oversized when displayed on camelback. 10  In contemporaneous accounts 
the banner was known by “the Arab flag” or “the Hijazi flag” and displayed a conventional 
three-color layout, featuring a hoist-sided triangle. 11 The flag’s color scheme, black, green, 
white, and crimson dissented from the iconic Ottoman standard with its red field and white 
moon-and-star. The colors represented bygone caliphates and its was a pastiche of quasi-Arab 
symbolism drawn from non-Ottoman history. One surviving artifact features a four-piece silken 
construction, though alternate textiles were possible. 12 The standard was flown on slender 
wooden flagstaffs adorned with spherical ornaments and tassels.   
 
9 Lawrence makes oblique references to these flags throughout Seven Pillars of Wisdom. It is never clear if he means 
the Arab Revolt flag or the Hashemite flag.  
10 “Pan-Arab Colours,” Flags of the World, accessed March 11, 2020, https://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/xo-
arabc.html.  
11 Dictionary of Vexillology, s.v. “Triangle,” Flags of the World, accessed March 11, 2020,   
https://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/vxt-dvt4.html#triangle 
12 There are a few surviving examples of World War I era Arab Revolt flags. One example is displayed in the 
Martyr’s Museum in Amman, Jordan.   
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The exact provenance of the Arab Revolt flag is opaque. Tim Marshall in, A Flag Worth 
Dying For: The Power and Politics of National Symbols credits the flag’s design to Sharif 
Hussein while entertaining the notion of British involvement. On its origin, Marshall wrote:  
The colors were combined into the designed and raised by the leader of the Arab Revolt 
of 1916, Sharif Hussein of Hejaz, who hoped to unite the myriad Arab tribes under one 
banner and win independence from Ottoman rule. Some historians argue a British 
diplomat, Mark Sykes, actually designed the flag; either way, it’s clear there was a 
British involvement, and Arab unity served British interests in the region at the time. 13   
 
However, Marshall’s interpretation begs more questions than it answers and encapsulates the 
fundamental historiographic problem of the Arab Revolt: Whose rebellion was it? If the 
insurgency and its battle-flag were Sharif Hussein’s brainchildren, Arab agency is preserved. 
However, if Mark Sykes directed its design, the revolt and its banner seem a catspaw of British 
interests.   
 
Figure 2.2 – From left to right: a comparison of the Arab Revolt flag (1916-18) and Iraqi 
National flag (1921-25). 14 
 
13 Tim Marshall, A Flag Worth Dying For: The Power and Politics of National Symbols (New York: Scribner, 
2016), 110.  




This question was further examined by Elie Podeh in, “The Symbolism of the Arab Flag 
in Modern Arab States: Between Commonality and Uniqueness.” In addition to Mark Sykes, the 
2011 article presents additional claimants for the standard’s design, early-twentieth-century Arab 
nationalist clubs. 15 The growth of Arab political associations within Ottoman cities occurred 
after the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 when the reform-minded Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP) seized power. 16 The governing junta initiated the Second Constitutional Era 
(1908-20), a period of liberalization where heretofore marginalized Arabs were integrated within 
the body politic. 17 In response to greater political efficacy, city-dwelling intellectuals founded 
associations dedicated to advance Arabism during the Ottoman Empire’s final years. The 
nationalist clubs, located in urban centers like Constantinople, Beirut, and Baghdad, professed a 
range of political orientations.  18 Before long, these associations needed symbolic 
representations of their political aspirations and created flags that contrasted the Ottoman 
standard.  
There were numerous associations dedicated to Arabism during the Second 
Constitutional Era. The Constantinople-based al-Muntada al-Adabi (1909-11) was an Arab 
literary society and selected a quad-color banner of white, black, green, and red. 19  According to 
vexillologist Ivan Sache, al-Muntada al-Adabi was inspired by the fourteenth-century poet Safi 
al-Din-al-Hili (d. 1349) who wrote, “White are our acts, black our battles, green our fields, And 
 
15 Elie Podeh, “The Symbolism of the Arab Flag in Modern Arab States: Between Commonality and Uniqueness,” 
Nations and Nationalism 17, no. 2, (2011): 419-442.  
16 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, s.v.,  “Young Turks,”  (New York: Facts on File, 
2009).  
17 Hasan Kayali, “The Elections of 1914 and the Eclipse of the Reform Movement,” Arabs and Young Turks: 
Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997). 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid.  
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red our swords.” 20  Choosing a less-crowded flag, the subversive al-Fatat designed a green, 
white, and black tricolor. 21 Sache further postulated Hizb al-Lamrkaziya al-Idariya al-Uthmani 
(Party for Ottoman Decentralization), a Cairo-based successor organization, used an identical 
flag. In a declaration of incipient Arabism, the party declared: “Praise be to our nation covered 
by the night (black), by our consciousness (white) and by hope (green)." 22 Like the Arab Revolt 
flag, both banners spanned a 2:3 aspect ratio. 23 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – Arab political club flags. From left to right: al-Muntada al-Adabi (1909-11) and al-
Fatat (1914). 24 
 
There is additional secondary literature to support Elie Podeh’s assertion of the Arab 
Revolt flag’s activist provenance.  In Arab Nationalism: The Politics of History and Culture in 
 
20 Ivan Sache, “Arab Literature Club, Istanbul (1909-1911),” Flags of the World, accessed March 3, 2020 
https://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/xo-arabc.html. 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ivan Sache, “Society of Young Arabs (1914),” Flags of the World, accessed March 3, 2020 
https://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/xo-arabc.html. 
23 This is following the examples cited by Flags of the World, but a 3:2 aspect ratio seems the post logical. Narrower 
ratios such as 2:1 make multipaneled flags look crowded as do excessive panels in general.  
24 “Pan-Arab Colours,” Flags of the World. 
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the Modern Middle East, Peter Wien examined the influence of Arab nationalist Fu’ad al-Khatib 
on Sharif Hussein:  
One story goes that one day during the days of the Arab Revolt, a representative of the 
Allied power suggests to Sharif Husayn to flag the Arab boats leaving the coast for the 
Red Sea in order to distinguish them from Turkish vessels. When Husayn and al-Khatib 
discuss possible colors and shapes for this banner, the latter had a recollection of a 
reunion with nationalist friends in Beirut where they conferred about a flag to represent 
Arabism. Al-Khatib brought up the historical banner of grand Arab state: White for the 
Umayyads, black for the Abbasids, Green for the Fatimids. 25 
In this version, the contribution of proto-nationalist intellectuals displaces British contributions 
to the Arab Revolt vexillography. However, this relegates Mark Sykes to a mere bystander, an 
officer trained in military practicalities, but ignorant of Islamic history. To borrow from 
Chakrabarty, historiographic minimization of British contributions to the Arab Revolt 
provincializes European agency.  However, Mark Sykes possessed the requisite understanding of 
regional history to recommend a symbolic convention to Hussein in 1916. He made several 
expeditions into Ottoman territory during the 1900s, cataloging the voyage in Dar-Ul-Islam: A 
Record of a Journey through Ten of the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey. 26 While he demonstrated 
an understanding of Arab society commensurate with early-twentieth-century orientalists, Sykes’ 
vexillographical aptitude is unclear. In sum, Mark Sykes could have designed the Arab Revolt 
flag, but did he?  Podeh conceded, “In the absence of new evidence, it is difficult to establish 
which narrative is more credible.” 27 
 
25 Peter Wien, Arab Nationalism: The Politics of History and Culture in the Modern Middle East (Florence: 
Routledge, 2017), 32.  
26 Mark Sykes, Dar-Ul-Islam: A Record of a Journey Through Ten of the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey (London: 
Bickers and Son, 1904). 
27 Podeh, “The Symbolism of the Arab Flag in Modern Arab States,” 424.  
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Without credible evidence whether Mark Sykes (or another British official) designed the 
flag, its provenance decentralizes into a vexillological Rorschach test. Inasmuch as the banner 
represented concepts beyond the Arab Revolt, the flag evokes several interpretations of varying 
degrees of Britishness. The question of ownership encapsulates the basic historiographic 
conundrum of Arab Revolt memory identified by Tim Marshall: Whose revolt was this? In an 
Arab-centric interpretation, the flag represented a kernel of proto-nationalism specific to the 
Second Constitutional Era but independent of (though conterminous with) British machinations. 
The second Sykes-centric version sidelines Sharif Hussein and makes the Arab Revolt a 
byproduct of duplicitous European wheeling and dealing. There are numerous possibilities 
between these two extremes. It is conceivable that Sykes’ death in 1919 engendered a non-Arab 
provenance to memorialize his contributions in transforming the Near East. Under this 
interpretation, Sykes’ contributions were benign, analogous to Betsy Ross’ mythic influences on 
the American flag in 1776. 28  
Whether Sharif Hussein was a founding father of Arab nationalism, an unwitting colonial 
auxiliary, or something in between was irrelevant in 1921. After the Franco-Syrian War, Britain 
retained enough confidence in Hashemite durability to install Faisal ibn Hussein on the Iraqi 
throne. National flags attracted little attention throughout 1921; the Cairo Conference and 
subsequent Hashemite installation made them an afterthought. Mere days before his coronation 
Faisal deliberated with Gertrude Bell about Iraq’s forthcoming flags. She recalled in a letter:   
We then spent a happy hour discussing (a) our desert frontier to south and west and (b) 
the national flag and Faisal's personal flag. For the latter we arranged provisionally this 
[sketch] i.e. the Hijaz flag with a gold crown on the red triangle. The red I must tell you is 
the colour of his house so he bears his own nom on it. Father, do for Heaven's sake tell 
me whether the Hijaz flag is heraldically right. You might telegraph. It's a very good flag 
 
28 For a full examination of the Betsy Ross mythos see, Marla R. Miller, Betsy Ross and the Making of America, 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2010).  
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and we could differentiate it for the Iraq by putting a gold star on the black stripe or the 
on the red triangle. The Congress will settle it directly it meets - do let me know in time. 
Also whether you have a better suggestion for Faisal's standard. 29  
 
That Iraq’s flag was still unsettled in August 1921 seems to demonstrate a fixed vexillology 
within the Hashemite sphere. The correspondence indicated that Bell, an accomplished 
orientalist, presupposed the Hejazi flag for Iraq’s national banner. 30 The differences between the 
national flags of Iraq, Transjordan, and Hijaz were minor to point of confusion. In the end, Iraq 
employed the Arab Revolt flag with a minor modification, swapping the positions of the green 
and white panels. 31 
Arab Revolt Flag Semiotics (1916 – 24) 
This section is devoted to understanding the Arab Revolt flag as a signifier that projected two 
ideas: Arabs distinctiveness and Hashemite historical continuity. The national banners of the 
Kingdom of Syria (1918-20), the Kingdom of Hejaz (1920-25), the Kingdom of Iraq (1921-58), 
and the Emirate of Transjordan (1921-46) were all mild reconfigurations of the Arab Revolt flag. 
32  The underlying semiotics of the Arab Revolt flag and its subsequent adoption by Hashemite 
polities indicated a historicized orientation of Arab identity after the First World War. There 
were substantial discursive elements imbedded within the flag: it was an anti-Ottoman symbol, a 
mark of rebellion, and supranational iconography. Marrying the symbolism of Arab political 
clubs to postwar vexillological representations of Hashemite authority required linking 
aspirational values such as sacrifice, purity, and hope to political symbolism. Therefore, 
 
29 Gertrude Bell to Hugh Bell, August 28, 1921.. 
30 Bell’s suggested additions could not clarify the Iraqi flag. A star on the uppermost panel broke vexillological 
conventions and rather than Iraq, Jordan adopted a centralized star for its flag remain there today. 
31 “Pan-Arab Colours,” Flags of the World. 
32 Ibid.  
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Sharifian vexillology projected a kernel of primordial nationalism upon its post-Ottoman 
identity, a self-conceptualization uncontained by international borders imposed under European 
auspices. Finally, by evoking the Umayyad, Abbasid, and Fatimid caliphates on its flags, the 
Hashemites implied a historical continuity with past Arab rulers.  
Considering its substantial associated literature, disentangling the historical insurrection, 
its much-ballyhooed players, and the subsequent Hashemite states is demanding. T.E. Lawrence 
in Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1926) documented the Arab Revolt’s battlefield heroism and daring-
do. While Lawrence omitted a detailed description of the Sharifian flag throughout his memoir, 
he dedicated considerable attention to an incipient Arab state under Sharifian captaincy. On 
Faisal ibn Hussein’s early adventures, Lawrence recalled:  
From Damascus four days later, his suite took horse and rode out east into the desert to 
take refuge with Nuri Shaalan, the Beduin chieftain; and the same day Feisal showed his 
hand. When he raised the Arab flag, the pan-Islamic supra-national State, for which 
Abdul Hamid had massacred and worked and died, and the German hope of the co-
operation of Islam in the world-plans of the Kaiser, passed into the realm of dreams. By 
the mere fact of his rebellion, the Sherif had closed these two fantastic chapters of 
history. 33   
To Lawrence, the flag’s physical appearance was irrelevant insofar that it communicated an anti-
Ottoman and pro-Hashemite message. It is unclear whether Lawrence’s views postdated the 
Arab Revolt, as he published Seven Pillars of Wisdom a decade after the uprising. 34 His 
reference to Sultan Abdul Hamid II and Kaiser Wilhelm II were unambiguous. In yoking their 
 
33 T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: a Triumph (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1955), 53.   
34 There was tremendous drama surrounding the publication of Seven Pillars of Wisdom. According to Lawrence he 
completed an early edition of his manuscript around 1919, but lost his only copy. He undertook a massive rewriting 
project which stalled will into the 1920s.  
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enemies together Lawrence united the British and the Arabs in a common cause while 
camouflaging London’s colonial ambitions. 35  
The collapse of the German Empire notwithstanding, to Lawrence, the flag symbolized 
Arab ascendancy over an unjustified Ottoman rulership. Ethnic exclusivity undergirded the 
insurgency and made Arab emancipation a wartime objective. When the Hashemites turned 
against Constantinople in 1916, they were uninterested in ejecting the CUP from power or 
engendering an Ottoman restoration. Instead, as Sharif Hussein explained to Henry McMahon, 
“… the whole of the Arab nation without any exception have decided in these last years to live, 
and to accomplish their freedom, and grasp the reigns of their administration both in theory and 
practice ….” 36 Therefore, to represent its distinctiveness Sharif Hussein selected a pastiche of 
Arab symbolism drawn from non-Ottoman periods caliphal rulership. In signifying the 
Umayyad, Abbasid, and Fatimid dynasties, the Arab Revolt flag presumed historical 
incompatibility with non-Arabs. Considering all the Gunpowder Empires (Ottoman, Safavid, and 
Mughal) were excluded, it is evident the Hashemites spurned an identity outside the Arabaphone 
world.  
To cement their legitimacy, the Hashemites manipulated the organizational banners that 
inspired the Arab Revolt flag. Before the insurgency, political clubs such as al-Muntada al-
Adabi and al-Fatat ascribed an aspirational meaning to their flags. 37 It is common for 
 
35 After the publication of the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence in 1923 these designs well understood. This was 
perhaps the source of Lawrence’s aggrandizement of the historical significance of the Arab Revolt. In the 
introduction Lawrence lamented, “It was evident from the beginning that if we won the war these promises would be 
dead paper, and had I been an honest adviser of the Arabs I would have advised them to go home and not risk their 
lives fighting for such stuff: but I salved myself with the hope that, by leading these Arabs madly in the final victory 
I would establish them, with arms in their hands, in a position so assured (if not dominant) that expediency would 
counsel to the Great Powers a fair settlement of their claims.” 
36 Hussein ibn Ali al-Hashemi to Henry McMahon, July 14, 1915, in Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon 
and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1937), 3-4.  
37 “Pan-Arab Colours,” Flags of the World. 
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organizations and governments to reconfigure a flag’s symbolism throughout its lifetime. 
Without a fixed color convention, “The meaning of flags can be temporarily captured by 
dominant discourses and invested with meaning.” 38 Since the discourse of Arabism leaned away 
from brotherhood and towards rebellion in 1916, color symbolism changed from concepts 
(purity, sacrifice, etc.) towards political objectives. A reimagining was necessary to articulate 
Hashemite wartime aims, thus reconfiguring black, green, white, and red as representations of 
Arab-ruled caliphates. The color scheme provided a veneer of historicity to the Arab Revolt and 
permitted Hashemite authority to piggyback onto an imagined golden age.  
If white, black, and green represented the Umayyads, Abbasids, and Fatimids, which 
caliphate did red symbolize? Red flags were associated with the Hashemites since the sixteenth 
century, and its addition to the Arab Revolt flag implied a twentieth-century restoration of Arab 
rule. 39 Therefore, red was the semiotic linchpin of the Arab Revolt flag, placing the Hashemites 
in historical continuity with the pre-Ottoman caliphates. The four-color combination ignored six-
hundred years of Ottoman rulership and made the Arab Revolt a transhistorical and liminal space 
engendering a glorious future under Hashemite captaincy. The correspondence between Sharif 
Hussein and Henry McMahon before the Arab Revolt was explicit in this intent. The first letter 
from Hussein sought, “England to approve the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam.” 40 
Later, the British affirmed this objective when McMahon answered, “We declare once more that 
His Majesty's Government would welcome the resumption of the Khalifate by an Arab of true 
race.” 41  
 
38 George Horvath, “The Semiotics of Flags: The New Zealand Flag Debate Deconstructed,” in Language and 
Literature in a Glocal World (Singapore: Springer, 2018), 121.   
39 “Hashemite Flags,” King Abdullah II, accessed March 13, 2020, https://kingabdullah.jo/en/page/the-
hashemites/hashemite-flags. 
40 “Hussein ibn Ali al-Hashemi to Henry McMahon, July 14, 1915,” in Correspondence between Sir Henry 
McMahon and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca, 3. 
41 Ibid., 4. 
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The intimations and promises outlined throughout the McMahon-Hussein 
Correspondence were not honored after World War I. The downfall of the Ottoman Empire did 
not facilitate a Hashemite-led caliphate but enabled British domination under the Mandate 
System. Though the postwar settlement denied Iraqis political independence, the groundwork for 
an eventual ejection of Britain was laid. The inability to manifest an Arab supranational 
government in 1921 did not erode Hashemite gravitas; their authority in Iraq persisted until 
1958. The internal strife which challenged and eventually toppled Hashemite authority in Iraq 
was rooted in the unrealized political aims articulated by Sharif Hussein to McMahon. Though a 
universal Arab polity did not materialize in 1921, attempts at greater Arab interconnectivity were 
attempted throughout the century, notably in 1963, after the Ba’th Party toppled Abd al-Karim 
Qasim.  
Second National Flag Vexillology (1925-1958) 
The Iraqi flag remained in its Arab Revolt configuration until 1925, when the constitution 
stipulated a modification. The kingdom’s governing document, the Organic Law, detailed the 
basics of administration and clarified monarchy’s role. On the national banner, Article IV 
stipulated:   
The flag of 'Iraq shall be of the following shape and dimensions. The length of the flag 
shall be double its breadth. It shall be divided horizontally into three colours of equal size 
and parallel to each other, the upper section being black, the others white and green 
respectively. On the side of the staff there shall be a red trapezoid, the greater base of 
which shall be equal to the breadth of the flag and the lesser base equal to the breadth of 
the white section, the height being equal to one-quarter of the length of the flag. In the 
centre there shall be two white stars of seven points each, in a perpendicular position, 
parallel to the staff. 42  
 
 
42 Constitution of ‘Iraq (Organic Law) (Geneva: League of Nations, 1929), 4. 
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Rather than a complete overhaul, the constitution modernized its national colors. From a 
vexillological standpoint, several features that differentiated Iraq’s second national flag from its 
1921 predecessor: a trapezoid, a modified aspect ratio, and dual seven-pointed stars. 43 This 
section focuses on the second national flag’s geometry and design, and postpones a more in-
depth consideration of its star symbolism. While the second national flag was an iteration of its 
forerunner, 1920s state representations occurred within an imperial milieu wherein British and 
Iraqi interests compromised in official portrayals of authority.   
Trapezoids, an unusual vexilloid feature, were mostly unknown on flags during the 
1920s. One explanation for its adoption under the Organic Law was the Art Deco movement 
(1910-39) which undergirded visual arts during the interwar period. Borrowing from Cubism, the 
movement employed streamlined surfaces and geometric shapes, projecting modernity and 
confidence. 44  Whether the Hashemites or colonial administrators injected this feature is 
unknown, but it is obvious the trapezoid was not a random modification. Like all creative 
endeavors, visual arts are products of their time, communicating ideas within the context of 
dominant artistic trends. Though thousands of miles away from European and American cities, 
vexillographers in Baghdad were not immune from the interwar domination of Art Deco. The 
same inertia that placed a simple trapezoid on the Iraqi flag in 1925, erected the renowned 
Chrysler Building in 1930. The second national flag possessed membership within a global 
artistic movement, demonstrating the interconnectivity of interwar design, culture, and politics. 
45  
 
43 Dictionary of Vexillology, s.v. “Trapezoid,” Flags of the World, accessed March 16, 2020, 
https://fotw.info/flags/vxt-dvt2.html#trapezium. 
44 Victoria Charles, Art Deco (New York: Parkstone Press, 2013), 7-14.  






Figure 2.4– Iraqi Second National Flag (1925 – 58). 46 
 
In addition to an innovative trapezoid, the second national flag narrowed its parameters, 
reducing its aspect ratio from a robust 2:3 to a comparatively lithe 1:2. 47 The reasons for this 
modification rested within British vexillological conventions observed throughout its 
commonwealth and evidenced London’s far-reaching powers to influence Iraqi policy. The 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 stipulated that Iraq would receive, “… advice and assistance as may 
be required during the period of this treaty, without prejudice to her national sovereignty.” 48 
Flags throughout the British Commonwealth shared a standardized 1:2 aspect ratio; they were 
subcomponents of a broader imperial aegis. Though vexillological uniformity situated Iraq 
 
46 Željko Heimer, Mamlakat al-Iraq, digital facsimile, Flags of the World, accessed March 15, 2020, 
https://fotw.info/flags/iq_kingd.html. 
47 Zoltán Horváth, “Kingdom of Iraq,” Flags of the World, accessed March 16, 2020, 
https://fotw.info/flags/iq_kingd.html.  
48 Treaty of Alliance between Britain and Irak, Signed at Baghdad, October 10, 1922 (London: His Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, 1925), 3.  
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among storied overseas possessions like Jamaica and South Africa, its design remained rooted in 
the Arab Revolt. 49 The 1:2 aspect ratio evidenced the limits of British control under the Mandate 
System; it was more influential than heavy-handed. Rather than manipulative crypto-colonialism, 
the reconfigured aspect ratio evidenced a triangulation of British and Iraqi interests during the 
1920s.  
A further investigation of colonial flags requires a comparative analysis of French and 
British vexillology during the 1920s. As imperial metropoles, both powers placed miniaturized 
copies of their respective banners within the cantons (designated positions of honor) of colonial 
flags. 50 In the French Mandates, its colonial administrators affixed the drapeau français on the 
cantons of the Alawite State (1922 - 36), the State of Damascus (1920 - 24), and other territories 
in Mandatory Syria. This practice extended throughout the British Empire, a vexillological 
convention observed within its Commonwealth, Mandates, crown colonies, and dependent 
territories. There were limited exceptions to this convention, generally representing territories 
which entered the British Empire under abnormal circumstances. In addition to Iraq, flags 
without a British canton included Gibraltar (1713 – pres.), the Sultanate of Egypt (1914-22), the 
Emirate of Transjordan (1921 – 46), and the Sheikhdom of Kuwait (1899 – 61). 51 For reference, 
 
49 The Jamaican and South African flags are well-known examples of postcolonial vexillology. In both examples, 
the former colonies replaced their flags with dramatic departures from its previous designs. On the other hand, 
Australia and New Zealand retained their British canton flags long after their independence. New Zealand’s flag 
survived a 2016 national referendum which produced a bevy of flags designed by citizens. One such design included 
a black field with a kiwi bird shooting a green laser beam from its eyes. See, Elle Hunt, “New Zealand's New Flag: 
15 Quirky Contenders,” The Guardian, May 14, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/15/new-
zealands-new-flag-15-quirky-contenders. 
50 Whitney Smith, Flags: Throughout the Ages and across the World (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), 13. Smith 
defines cantons as, “…the upper hoist corner of a flag or rectangular field filling that area.” Though notable flags 
like Chile exist, cantons are generally one-quarter proportions. Notable examples of one-quarter cantons include the 
flags of the United States and New Zealand. 
51 This is far from a comprehensive list. A notable examples includes the Sultanate of Egypt (1914 - 22) which had a 
semi-colonial relationship with London, but like Iraq and Kuwait was administratively non-conformist.   
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Figure 2.5  provides a visual comparison of the French and British Mandates’ flags during the 
period of 1713 - 1961.   
Gibraltar notwithstanding, most non-British canton flags represented territories within the 
Middle East. 52  That Iraq escaped the vexillological uniformity imposed upon British territories 
evidenced an exceptional relationship between London and Baghdad during the interwar period. 
Armed Iraqi tribesmen resisted overt colonization in 1920, launching an insurgency resulting in 
numerous civilian fatalities and costing David Lloyd George’s government £40million. 53 The 
installation of Faisal ibn Hussein on the Iraqi throne did not alter Baghdad’s sub-state power 
imbalance. Though the crisis abated, a rebellion against unpopular British policies remained a 
possibility. Even a decade after the Hashemite ascendancy, Iraqi tribesman owned an estimated 
100,000 rifles, while government forces possessed a mere 15,000 shoulder-arms. 54 An additional 
insurrection within the British Isles, the Anglo-Irish War (1918-21), extended London’s security 
obligations and made an impingement upon Iraqi sovereignty a needless expenditure. 55 
Hashemite Iraq maintained its second national flag, never under serious threat of British heavy-
handedness in matters of its vexillology.  
 
52 One notable exception, the Colony of Aden (1937 – 63) had nineteenth-century roots, managed as settlement 
under British Indian authority (see Figure 2.5). 
53 Dodge, Inventing Iraq, 8. There are varying accounts of the British response in 1920. Dodge reports that upwards 
of 130,000 troops were needed to suppress the rebellion. During archival research for this thesis I found 
contemporaneous accounts citing far fewer troops employed, around 10,000 men. See, John Randolph, British 
Military Occupation of Iraq and British Policy Towards Iraq Army (Baghdad: Department of State, November 27, 
1927). The reports are on microfilm 890g.015 (1910-1929), M722, roll 21.   
54 Jeremy Black, Introduction to Global Military History: 1775 to the Present Day, 2nd ed., (New York: Routledge, 
2013), 115.  
55 S.J. Connolly, ed., The Oxford Companion to Irish History, s.v., “Anglo-Irish War,” (Oxford: Oxford University 




Figure 2.5 – Comparison of French and British imperial flags, 1713 – 1961. Top row – the 
Alawite State, the State of Damascus, the State of Aleppo.  Middle row – the Colony of Jamaica, 
the Colony of Aden, and New Zealand. Bottom row – the Kingdom of Iraq, Gibraltar, and, the 
Sheikdom of Kuwait. 56 
 
Second National Flag Semiotics (1925-1958) 
There were numerous diplomatic questions unanswered after the First World War concluded in 
1918. While the Ottoman Empire was dismembered under treaties with the Allied Powers, its 
successor republic possessed enough oomph to press London for a favorable settlement on its 
southeastern border. The “Mosul Question” centered around Ankara’s forthcoming discharge of 
a third Ottoman vilayet to Mandatory Iraq, a matter the Turks contested from 1918 onward. The 
 
56 For these flags see, “Alawite State, State of Damascus, State of Aleppo, Jamaica, Colony of Aden, New Zealand, 




question was answered in 1923 after the Turkish War of Independence (1919-23) ended and its 
borders were secured under the Treaty of Lausanne. 57 In 1924 the League of Nations established 
the so-called Brussels Line, creating a tentative boundary between Mandatory Iraq and the 
Turkish Republic. 58 Iraq ratified the Organic Law in 1925, and the following year the Treaty of 
Ankara cemented the Turkish border. 59 This move added a substantial Kurdish population to 
Iraq, challenging the primordial nationalism presupposed in the Arab Revolt and its 
corresponding symbolism embodied by the second national flag.    
 The Mosul annexation coincided with the 1925 ratification of the Organic Law, the 
constitution which prescribed the second national flag.  On its national banner, the document 
stipulated in part, “In the centre there shall be two white stars of seven points each, in a 
perpendicular position, parallel to the staff.” 60  The addition of the seven-pointed stars was 
understood to symbolize Arab-Kurdish unity following the League of Nations’ partitioning of the 
Mosul vilayet by the Brussels Line in 1924. 61 The move pulled southern Kurdistan into 
Mandatory Iraq and grafted a patchwork population of Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, and 
Turkmen onto an otherwise ethnically homogenous Arab bloc. 62  As a communications 
platform, flags possess a limited capacity to transmit information. This constraint was 
exacerbated by the ethnic underpinnings of Arab Revolt semiotics mixed with Kurdish 
 
57 Mustafa Baduk, Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, s.v., “Lausanne, Treaty of,”  (New York: Facts of File, 
2009).  
58 Historical Dictionary of Iraq, 2nd ed., s.v.,  “Treaty of Ankara,” (Lanham, UK: The Scarecrow Press, 2013). 
59 Treaty between the United Kingdom and Iraq and Turkey: Regarding the Settlement of the Frontier Between 
Turkey and Iraq (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1927). 
60 Constitution of ‘Iraq (Organic Law), 4.   
61 John Randolph, Report No. 68: National Flag of Iraq (Baghdad: Department of State, May 14, 1925). These State 
Department cables are located in the National Archives at College Park. The reports are on microfilm 890g.015 
(1910-1929), M722, roll 21.  
62 Jordi Tejel Gorgas, “Making Borders from below: the Emergence of the Turkish– 
Iraqi Frontier, 1918–1925,” Middle Eastern Studies 54, no. 5, (2018): 811-826.  
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symbolism. The inclusion of dual seven-pointed stars, a symbolic Arab-Kurdish union, marked 
the first representation of a non-Arab minority on state iconography. The second national flag 
inadvertently implied an ethno-sectarian stratum which included Kurds but othered Assyrians, 
Turkmen, Armenians, and Jews.   
 Iraqi independence in 1932 only accelerated tensions between Baghdad and marginalized 
persons; minority groups often formed militias to resist state authority. 63 This ethno-sectarian 
divide first manifested during an August 1933 military incursion against Assyrian rebels 
operating around Dohuk. Elements of the Iraqi army and Kurdish irregulars conducted punitive 
raids against Assyrian settlements, the worst attacks focusing around the village of Semele. 
Hundreds of civilians were killed during the operation, a contemporary report stating:   
The London Times declared yesterday that there was reason to believe 500 had already 
been slain, 200 of whom had no connection with the revolt. According to The London 
Times, a British official who visited the villages around Simel, forty miles north of 
Mosul, reported to London that he hand found them full of panic-stricken women and 
children and had counted 315 Assyrian dead apparently killed by the so-called irregular 
police. 64 
Violence against Assyrians predated the Semele Massacre in 1933. During a series of lesser-
known massacres, concurrent with the Armenian Genocide, the Ottomans killed thousands of 
Assyrians during the First World War. 65 The episode highlighted a profound contradiction 
within Iraqi identity, a question which has harried its society for one-hundred years: Given that 
 
63 Adeed Dawisha, Iraq: a Political History from Independence to Occupation (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2009), 36-39.  
64 Ferdinand Khun Jr., “Britain to Take Up Massacres in Iraq; Rulers Plan Flight,” New York Times, August 17, 
1933.   
65 Hannibal Travis, “The Assyrian Genocide a Tale of Oblivion and Denial,” in Forgotten Genocides (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 124-127.  
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Arabism was Iraq’s foundational political orientation, what was the appropriate role of non-
Arabs in Iraqi society?  
 Flags are ill-equipped to answer more in-depth questions about societal ills. As 
representations of state authority, official iconography often reflects imperfections of national 
character without intimating a remedy. In rejiggering the symbolism of Second Constitutional 
Era political flags (Figure 2.3) from generic aspirational values into features of Arab 
distinctiveness, there was always be a degree of othering implied in Arab Revolt-rooted 
vexillology. Contemporary observers found the veneer of Arab-Kurdish unity dubious. John 
Randolph, the American consul in Baghdad, reported:  
The real reason for the presence of the two stars in the National flag, however, seem to be 
due more of less to a plan brought forward several years ago at an Arab Conference in 
Damascus, when it was suggested and agreed, I am informed, that the Kingdom of the 
Hijaz was to have no stars in its flag, the Arab Kingdom of Syria was to have one star, 
and the Arab kingdom of Iraq was to have two stars, a plan, which, it was thought, looked 
forward to an ultimate union of federation of Arab states. The plan did not work out, but 
the Arab leaders of Iraq have placed the two white starts on the Iraq flag. 66  
 
Indeed, a June 24th, 1924 Baghdad Times article reported the Iraqi statesmen, Naji al-Suwaidi 
and Yasin al-Hashimi, advocated for flag’s two-star configuration. 67 Both al-Suwaidi and al-
Hashimi were dedicated Arab nationalists and improbable advocates for Arab-Kurdish unity. 68 
The most favorable interpretation of their vexillography was to honor the defunct Sharifian 
order, and a poignant gesture following the Kingdom of Hijaz’s capitulation in December of 
1925. It was not that Iraq should have adorned its national flag with iconography relating to 
 
66 John Randolph, Report No. 68.  
67 Ibid., Annex No. 3.  
68 Historical Dictionary of Iraq, 2nd ed., s.v.,  “Yasin al-Hashimi.” 
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ethno-sectarian minorities. Instead, the idea that its semiotics should denote primordial 
nationalism was a roadblock to ethnic unity during the 1920s and 1930s. It is the reason the Free 
Officers under Abd al-Karim Qasim replaced the second national flag in 1959 with a more 
equitable design.   
 
Description of Iraqi Heraldry (1931-1958) 
Heraldry, “the Shorthand of History,” is an auxiliary historical science concerned with the 
identification and analysis of arms. 69  Properly put, arms are a distinct pictorial representation of 
a royal, nobleman, or vassal using a system of paramilitary symbolism. Arms is catchall 
terminology governing all heraldic images, from unpretentious family crests to full achievements 
of arms, replete with crowns, capes, and martial implements. In monarchies, the sovereign’s 
arms usually become its civic heraldry, the case with the Kingdom of Iraq under the Hashemites. 
While a national flag received considerable attention under the 1925 constitution, Iraq 
procrastinated on its national heraldry. Article IV of the Organic Law stipulated, “…the arms, 
insignia and decorations of the State shall be determined in accordance with special laws.” 70  In 
European heraldry, the form and symbolism of arms were delineated in letters patent, a detailed 
description authorized by royal proclamation. The document, sometimes called a blazon, 
outlined the arms and codified its distinctiveness, limiting confusion between other heraldic 
devices. 71 In twentieth-century Iraq, administrative decrees were transmitted via the Iraq 
Government Gazette. Published in English, the periodical permitted the government to document 
 
69 Arthur Charles Fox-Davies, The Art of Heraldry: an Encyclopaedia of Armory, (London: T.C. & E.C. Jack, 1904), 
v. For information about heraldic history see, Ottfried Neubecker, Heraldry: Sources, Symbols, and Meaning, (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), 6-7.  
70 Constitution of ‘Iraq (Organic Law), 4.   
71 Neubecker, Heraldry, 42.  
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contemporaneous lawmaking and communicate within the broader Anglophone world. Rather 
than a traditional patent, the Hashemite government published its blazon in the gazette. In a long-
winded missive dated June 7th, 1931, the king decreed:  
The Coat of Arms of the State of Iraq shall consist of a mantling having the colours of the 
‘Iraq flag, the red being at the top followed downward consecutively by the black, the 
white, and the green, surrounded by a gilt margin, and wrinkled in the form of a rose at 
the two upper corners and bound by a gilt ribbon ending in a form of a tassel. On the top 
of the mantling shall be placed the crown of ‘Iraq supported by two stars, with the 
colours of the “Iraq flag, each with seven rays, symbolizing the Arabs and the Kurds. In 
the centre of the mantling shall be a shield with a frame on the upper side of which shall 
be inscribed “al Adlu Asa’ul Mulk”, and at the bottom of it “1339”, being the Hijra date 
of the accession of H.M. King Faisal I, to the throne of ‘Iraq. On both sides of the frame, 
between the two aforementioned inscriptions, there shall be certain ornaments of Arab 
style, and in the center of the shield, four date trees bending which appear in the horizon 
representing the Tigris and the Euphrates running downward and meeting in front of the 
date tree, thus representing Shatt-al-Arab, On the junction of the two rivers there shall be 
a sword and lance crossed, the former being on the right and the latter on the left side. 
The shield shall be supported by an Arab horse on the right side and a Babylonian Lion 
on the left. On the lower part of the mantling, beneath the shield, there shall be a cotton 
branch and a sheaf of seven ears of wheat crossing each other. 72 
 
This announcement was made sixteen months before Iraq was granted its independence in 
October 1932. The Hashemites went an entire decade before adopting its arms; the timing and 
opulence of their creation were probably linked. Iraqi heraldry intended to communicate its 
distinctiveness and political maturity in a manner understood by European powers. 73 
 
 
72 Iraq Government Gazette 28, June 7, 1931. As with the previous State Department papers, this copy of the Iraq 
Government Gazette is located in the National Archives at College Park. The reports are on microfilm 890g.015 
(1910-1929), M722, roll 22.  
73 The reporting of the Semele Massacres echoed about readiness for independence, a common complaint of 
metropoles throughout history. The New York Times reported, “The British are fully aware, too, that excesses 
against the Assyrians tend to justify the suspicions of the French and others who contend that the Iraqis were not 




Figure 2.6 – Hashemite achievement of arms (1931 - 1958). 74 
 
Semiotics of Iraqi Heraldry (1931-1958) 75 
Though the creation of Hashemite arms was tied to Iraqi independence, its specifics conveyed a 
deeper message about a presupposed national character and identity. Though the scientific 
qualities of heraldry make a semiotic analysis practical, the Iraqi example is visually 
overwhelming. Its design contained over a dozen distinct armorial accessories, each projecting a 
notion about Hashemite Iraq on the precipice of independence in 1931. As with its vexillology, 
Iraqi heraldry was a product of its time, communicating a message about its monarchy’s fitness 
 
74 “Iraq,” The Red Lion, database, accessed March 22, 2020, https://www.hubert-herald.nl/Iraq.htm. 
75 I’m deeply grateful to my classmate Natalie Salive who introduced me to the topicETD  of lion semiotics. Though 
she did not directly contribute to this project, our discussions on animal studies and leonine representations on state 
iconography influenced the direction of this section.  
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in three parts. This symbolism included endorsements of Hashemite authority, agricultural 
fertility, and transhistorical connectivity with an assumed Mesopotamian past. Though their 
selection was not arbitrary, there is nothing about inherently “Iraqi” about these symbols. They 
were, as Eric Hobsbawm said, invented traditions which “…is taken to mean a set of practices, 
normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules of ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to 
inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies 
continuity with the past.” 76  
Hashemite Royal Authority:  
The first message Iraqi Hashemites wished to convey was the righteousness of their authority as 
monarchs. Its arms signified this message with a crowed crest, the Hashemite ascension year, its 
royal motto, and cavalry weapons (Figure 2.7). 77 The crown was a departure from the previous 
Ottoman heraldry, another emulation of European arms, which featured a turban. 78 Of its 
numerous qualities, the crown was an overtly European symbol, meant to dampen perceptions of 
otherness within the Iraqi regime. Its crest symbolized a willingness to conform to Western 
standards of monarchical convention. Though seemingly boilerplate, the saber and lance crossed 
over the Shatt al-Arab remind viewers of Arab military prowess made manifest in the Arab 
Revolt. 79  As with its crown, the weapons are another nod towards British-Arab partnership and 
 
76 Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 1.  
77 Neubecker, Heraldry, 52. Throughout armorial history crowns were a royal prerogative with lesser houses often 
added helmets, while supranational polities such as the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacy, or the bore embellished 
crowns and tiaras. 
78 Ivan Sache, “Ottoman Empire: Flags and coats of arms shown in the Topkapi Museum (Istanbul),” Flags of the 
World, database, accessed March 25, 2020, https://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/tr-topk.html#coa. 
79 “Heraldic Meanings,” s.v. “Sword / Dagger / Dart/ Sabre / Scimitar,” American College of Heraldry, accessed 
March 25, 2020, http://www.americancollegeofheraldry.org/achsymbols.html. 
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played into romantic notions of Sharifian cavalrymen harrying Ottoman troops during World 
War I.  
 
Figure 2.7 – Symbols of Hashemite authority on Iraqi national arms.  
 
 To balance its Eurocentric symbolism, traditional elements were incorporated on its 
escutcheon (shield), a rounded and embellished with decorative lattice expressly stipulated as 
“… Arab style….” 80 The inscribed motto “al adlu asa’ul mulk” (justice is the foundation of 
property) speaks to the crown’s capacity to make and decipher laws. It symbolized the 
centralization of authority from its traditional tribal powerbases towards the Hashemite throne in 
Baghdad. The lowermost portion of the escutcheon where the Eastern Arabic numerals  ١٣٣٩
 
80 Iraq Government Gazette 28, June 7, 1931. Neubecker, Heraldry, 52. An escutcheon is the portion of an amoral 
achievement which featuring a shield and is the main component of a coat of arms. Rounded shields are somewhat 
rare in heraldry, another sign of the arms’ 20th century and non-European provenance. For a counterpointing 
evolution of escutcheon design in European heraldry, see Neubecker, Heraldry, 76-77.  
31 
 
(1339 AH) marked the year of Faisal’s coronation on the hijri calendar. 81 From a semiotic 
standpoint, the inclusion of Islamic enumeration signified Hashemite piety and blood-relation to 
the Prophet Muhammad, therefore buttressing Sharifian legitimacy in Iraq. By balancing 
symbols familiar in European heraldry with distinct Arab representations, the Hashemite arms 




Figure 2.8 – Symbols of agricultural fertility on Iraqi national arms.  
Agricultural Fertility  
The escutcheon’s interior depicted the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates at the Shatt al-
Arab, the sources of agricultural yields for thousands of years. Its riverine symbolism was 
 
81 On the Gregorian calendar, Faisal’s coronation occurred on August 23, 1921 which corresponds to the 18th day of 
Dhu’l Hijja, 1339 AH. For calculations see, “Conversion of Hijri A.H. (Islamic) and A. D. Christian (Gregorian) 




understood by Europeans and Arabs alike. 82 Though Iraq’s agriculture declined during the 
twentieth century, the imagery propagated an identity contingent upon ancient waters for 
subsistence. The semiotics of a given subject need not conform to a greater reality; signifiers 
may project possibilities ranging from the aspirational to the propagandistic. During the 1920s, 
Iraq dominated the date-processing industry accounting for over 80% of global output with its 
production boosted under British sponsorship during the 1930s. 83 However, wheat and cotton 
yields were hampered by limitations of the Iraqi irrigation system and competition with other 
cotton-producing possessions like India. 84 Regardless of its actual output, representations of 
fecundity were an essential feature of Iraqi identity to Europeans and Arabs alike. Agricultural 
signifiers bolstered British paternalistic tendencies while reinforcing a universal human 
aspiration - that one’s nation is a land of peace and plenty.     
Transhistorical Continuity  
In an oblique reference to a continuity with an imagined past, the Iraqi government stipulated 
that two mammals, a lion and a horse, were placed on its national arms. 85  The mammalian 
supporters (figures attached to arms) are standard features throughout European and postcolonial 
heraldry. 86  However, the placement of an Arabian horse, like its golden weapons, reminds 
viewers of a martial identity rooted in Hashemite cavalry prowess of the Arab Revolt, a link to 
Iraq’s recent history. While horses enjoy occasional representation on arms, lions are near-
 
82 While the exact Arabic etymology is unclear, Mesopotamia come from the “Hellenistic Greek Μεσοποταμία < 
μεσοποτάμιος between rivers.” The term did not enter into English until 1651. See, Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. 
“Mesopotamia” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
83 Samira Haj, The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology, New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1997, 31. 
84 Ibid., 31-39.  
85 Iraq Government Gazette 28, June 7, 1931 
86 Neubecker, Heraldry, 52 – “Supporters are decorative devices which do not form part of the arms proper. They 
usually have the form of animals or men.”  For a brief look at postcolonial heraldry see, Lilian Cailleaud, “The 
Colonial Influence on Emblems of Independent Nations in Africa,” Vexillum, no. 8 (December 2019): 4-8.  
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ubiquitous supporters. Ottfried Neubecker identified fifty distinct derivations of lions throughout 
armorial history in various poses symbolizing hereditary rulership. 87 For example, when a 
leonine supporter exposes its forepaws and stands single-footed, it is considered rampant. A 
beast with groundward facing paws, is passant. Heraldic jargon includes unique terminology for 
crouching lions, sleeping lions, and lions chopped to pieces. 88 An examination of Hashemite 
arms begs the question: was a leonine supporter included on the Kingdom of Iraq’s arms 
intended to suggest a linkage between Hashemite authority to pre-Islamic Mesopotamia?  
 
 




87 Neubecker, Heraldry, 110-112. 




Figure 2.10 – Comparison on British (left) and Iraqi (right) animal supporters. 89 
 
Though the Iraq Government Gazette stipulated a “Babylonian lion” on its national arms, 
not all beasts are created equal. Indeed, lions were associated with the Mesopotamian deity 
Inanna (sometimes called Ishtar), though the creature featured on the Hashemite arms was a 
contemporary heraldic accessory. 90 Along with the Kingdom of Iraq, numerous twentieth- 
century nation-states employed leonine supporters on their heraldry. Far-flung examples 
included Morocco, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Sierra Leon, and imperial Iran, each featuring 
lions in various poses. 91  The starkest instance came from Britain itself, whose royal arms 
included a sinister lion and dexter unicorn, both in a rampant posture (Figure 2.10). 92 Whether 
the Hashemites intended an obsequious emulation of British heraldry or subtle manipulation is 
 
89 Sodacan, Royal coat of arms of the United Kingdom, adopted 1837, digital facsimile, 2010, Wikimedia Commons, 
accessed April 15, 2020, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_heraldry#/media/File:Royal_Coat_of_Arms_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg. 
90 Chikako E. Watanabe, “The Symbolic Role of Animals in Babylon: a Contextual Approach to the Lion, the Bull, 
and the Mušhuššu,” Iraq 77, (2015): 215-224.  
91 Geoffrey Briggs, National Heraldry of the World (New York: The Viking Press, 1974).  
92 Neubecker, Heraldry 44-50. In heraldic terminology dexter is the right portion of arms and sinister is the left.  
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unknown. Much of Faisal’s effectiveness stemmed from his diplomatic aptitude, arbitrating 
between British domination and Iraqi needs, an awareness his successors struggled to replicate. 
   To further interrogate whether a Babylonian lion or a modern facsimile appears on the 
Iraqi achievement necessitates a thorough consideration of their respective functions. In 
contemporary armorial representations, leonine supports are ferocious guardians of royal 
authority. Like Iraq, in postcolonial Africa, numerous successor regimes selected lion supporters 
to represent their new polities, irrespective of an association with former metropoles. 93  Though 
willing to eject foreigners from their countries, postcolonial elites often maintained a vestigial 
continuity with colonial authority. Though its intentions were obscure, Iraq preferred an oblique 
connection with Britain while implying a relationship to Babylonia to engender Iraqi 
distinctiveness. By conditioning its lion, the Hashemites situated themselves between imperial 
authority and an imagined pre-Islamic realm populated with fantastic creatures and goddesses.  
An examination of Mesopotamian artifacts projects an alternate narrative, one differing 
from Hashemite propaganda featured in the Iraq Government Gazette. While their full function 
is unknown, Babylonian lions projected a different symbolism, often depicting animals in a 
subservient fashion (Figure 2.11). 94 From a semiotic standpoint, it seems reasonable to assume 
lion iconography transmitted different messages to ancient Mesopotamians than twentieth-  
century Iraqis. This included lions trampled underfoot and manhandled by heroic hunters, the 
playthings of divine beings. The commoditization of animals in Mesopotamian religious art was 
intended to elevate gods above mortals, not kings above commoners. Putting aside the arms’ 
 
93 Cailleaud, “The Colonial Influence on Emblems of Independent Nations in Africa.” 
94 Watanabe, “The Symbolic Role of Animals in Babylon.”  
36 
 
obvious anachronisms, the employment of pre-Islamic iconography highlighted the 
interconnectivity of history and burgeoning Iraqi national identity during the 1930s.  
 
Figure 2.11 -Mesopotamian religious iconography featuring lions: From the Ishtar Gate featured 
in the Pergamon Museum in Berlin is Walking Lion from the Processional Way (top left), from 
the British Museum is the so-called Burney Relief (top right), also from the British Museum is in 
Assyrian relief Lion Hunt of Ashurbanipal (bottom left), and from the Oriental Institute Museum 
is an Akkadian representation of Inanna on a seal (bottom left). 95  
 
95 Walking Lion from the Processional Way, relief, Mesopotamia, 604 BCE – 562 BCE, Pergamon Museum, 
accessed March 26, 2020, https://www.smb.museum/en/museums-institutions/pergamonmuseum/collections-
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Case Study: Mesopotamian Themed Iraqi Postage Stamps 
This analysis does not suggest an antagonistic relationship between Iraq and the British Empire, 
wherein both actors made Machiavellian gambits on a historicized chessboard. Instead, the 
British and Hashemites engaged in activities that mutually informed their positions in post-
Ottoman Mesopotamia in a process Orit Bashkin called “Iraqi hybridity.” 96 Under this rubric, 
pluralistic tendencies pervaded across class and ethno-sectarian strata and comingled with British 
administration, creating blended notions of Iraqi distinctiveness. Cultural hybridization accounts 
for the obscured attributions of Iraqi state iconography in Hashemite Iraq. A simple question 
such as, “Did Britain directly contribute to Iraqi iconography?” could reasonably be answered as, 
“Yes, no, and sometimes.”  The contributions to a greater Iraqi identity during the Hashemite 
rule were a mosaic of notions without a distinct Arab of British attribution. For a national 
character to take root, ideas about a population must be communicated and accepted as valid. 
Britain could no more dictate the parameters of Iraqi identity than Baghdad could outright reject 
its Mandatory interlocutors. As Bashkin elaborated, “These hybrid relationships thus contest the 
assumption of the colonizers to identify a recognizable colonized subject who is in need of 
civilizing and guidance.”  97 
  
 
research/collection-highlights.html. Burney Relief (Queen of the Night), fired clay relief, Mesopotamia, 19th – 18th 
century BCE, the British Museum, accessed March 26, 2020,  
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rtId=1. The Lion Hunt of Ashurbanipal, relief, Mesopotamia, c. 600 BCE, https://blog.britishmuseum.org/lion-
hunting-the-sport-of-kings-2 British Museum, accessed March 26, 2020, https://blog.britishmuseum.org/lion-
hunting-the-sport-of-kings-2. Sailko, “Akkadian period seal in black limestone with foot on a lion’s back and a 
devotee,” Wikimedia Commons, accessed March 26, 2020, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Periodo_accadico,_sigillo_in_calcare_nero_con_ishtar_con_piede_su_sch
iena_di_leone_e_una_devota,_2350-2150_ac_ca.jpg. 
96 Orit Bashkin, The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
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Figure 2.12 - Iraqi postage stamps depicting various symbols of Mesopotamia (c.1925). 98 
 
Nowhere was this interplay more present than in the production of postage stamps during 
the British occupation of Ottoman Mesopotamia and the subsequent administration of Mandatory 
Iraq. Unlike flags and national arms, stamps were symbols of Hashemite authority Iraqis 
encountered daily, regardless of confession, ethnicity, or social strata. Iraqi postal history is a 
treasure trove of philatelic representations of state authority, beginning with repurposed Ottoman 
stamps under British auspices in 1914. 99  After pre-occupation supplies were exhausted, a bevy 
 
98 “British Mandate Issue, 1923-1923,” Rezonville, database, accessed March 26, 2020, 
http://www.rezonville.com/iraq#/ir05/ 
99 Clayton Rubec and Akthem al-Manseer, Guide to the Postal Stationary of Iraq (London: Royal Philatelic Society 
London, 2016), 1.  
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of Mesopotamian-themed postage stamps were issued in Mandatory Iraq starting in 1923. 100 The 
stamps depicted a broad swath of ancient history, covering thousands of years and irrespective of 
the specific polities which ruled Mesopotamia. As with its lion supports, the transhistoricity of 
pre-Islamic Mesopotamia only required the flimsiest of plausibility. For example, the postage 
stamps featured in Figure 2.12 feature imagery from three distinct polities which occupied 
Mesopotamia; that the Assyrian, Babylonian, and Parthian Empires were not interrelated was 
irrelevant. In a sign of sectarian unity, additional stamps highlighted themes of Islamic 
landmarks within Baghdad, the Abu Haifa Mosque (Sunni), and al-Kadhimiya Mosque (Shia) 
both featured in the 1923 set (Figure 2.14).  
 
 
Figure 2.13 – Abu Hanifa Mosque and al-Kadhimiya Mosque postage stamps (c.1923) 101 
 
 
100 “British Mandate Issue, 1923-1923,” Rezonville.  




Figure 2.14 – Iraqi postage stamps celebrating its Babylonian UNESCO World Heritage 
cites (c. 2019). 102 
 
That Iraqis purchased the stamps and mailed letters within a British-administered postal 
system seems to contradict some postcolonial theorists’ suggestions of an insidious relationship 
between historicization and colonialism. In the Iraqi example, the kingdom was assembled from 
whole cloth in 1921. Though under British sponsorship, London needed more than a Hashemite 
puppet-state - it needed Iraqis who accepted their own distinctiveness. As with its flags and 
heraldry, postage stamps permitted a semblance of historical continuity much gentler than 
Chakrabarty asserted in, “Historicism is what enabled European domination of the world in the 
 
102 These are commemorative stamps from my personal collection.  
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nineteenth century.” 103 When it came to its national iconography there were limits on 
acceptability within Mandatory Iraq which precluded British philatelic domination. Historical 
and cultural themes notwithstanding, Iraqi postage stamps predominantly featured its three 
Hashemite kings Faisal, Ghazi, and Faisal II. It is worth noting George V never appeared on an 
Iraqi postage stamp during this period, though his sovereignty over Iraq from 1921 to 1932 was 
unquestionably true. 104  If further evidence is needed, consider the 2019 stamps (Figure 2.15) 
which commemorated Iraq’s UNESCO World Heritage sites.  They were released almost one-
hundred years after Mandatory Iraq issued a Mesopotamian-themed postage stamp and seventy 
years after the Hashemites fell.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter was concerned with graphic representations of Iraqi state authority during its 
Hashemite period (1921-58).  The period after the First World War saw unprecedented change 
throughout the Middle East. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire left its Arab provinces 
vulnerable to European colonial ventures under the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Sharifian 
Solution. Though Iraq was established in 1921, its state iconography had roots in the Second 
Constitutional Era of the Ottoman Empire. Arab political clubs permitted during the 1900s and 
1910s laid the groundwork for proto-nationalism and represented their movements in a four-
color scheme: red, white, green, and black. The colors stood for aspirational values of Arabism, 
and this convention carried into the creation of the Arab Revolt flag under the Hashemites in 
 
103 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: 
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1916. Iraq used a modified version of this flag until 1958, despite adding a sizable non-Arab 
population of Kurds, Assyrians, and Turkman in 1926.  
 Iraq refrained from pictorial representations of state authority until its impending 
admission into the League of Nations. In 1931 Iraq published its national heraldry, an elaborate 
design intended to communicate the kingdom’s maturity and preparedness for independence the 
following year. The arms were a triangulation of British and Arab symbolism, which conveyed 
notions of Iraqi distinctiveness in a manner understood by Europeans. Though historically 
questionable, Hashemite arms communicated authority, agricultural fertility, and a transhistorical 
continuity with pre-Islamic Mesopotamia. This subject was seen on postage stamps beginning in 
1923 and messaged a willingness to associate with a presupposed past to supplement Iraq’s 
limited historical superstructure. In sum, Iraq’s iconographic representations of state authority 
were grounded in the realities of the Hashemite ascendency in Mandatory Iraq. As a group, its 
flags, heraldry, and state iconography amounted to an opening argument for future discussions 





This chapter is concerned with symbols of state authority from 1959 to 2003. During this period, 
Iraq underwent a dramatic political transformation, overthrowing its monarchy in 1958 and 
enduring a turbulent decade before the Ba’th Party consolidated its hold on Iraqi governance in 
1968. Alterations in state iconography manifested a range of good-faith attempts to define Iraqi 
identity within several categories. The first notion was expressed as a desire to define Iraqiness 
within the context of its geographic parameters and without privileging a specific ethnicity. This 
required the state to imply a metaphysical connection to Mesopotamian peoples who inhabited 
Iraq thousands of years before its establishment in 1921. The second version of Iraqi identity was 
rooted in Pan-Arabism, the interconnectivity of Arabs throughout the Middle East. This 
orientation permitted Iraq to engage as a regional player but often placed Baghdad at odds with 
its Kurdish population. These two extremes were not monolithic and equal helpings of civic 
nationalism and Pan-Arab nationalism pervaded during this period.  
 The first modification of Iraqi iconography occurred in 1959 after the dissolution of the 
short-lived Arab Union, a brief supranational Hashemite polity that linked Iraq and Jordan. 105 
The previous year a politically unaligned (but nominally Nasserist) cabal of military 
commanders overthrew the Hashemite government and established the Republic of Iraq. The so-
called Free Officers, headed by General Abd al-Karim Qasim, attempted to create a republic free 
from diplomatic obligations and dedicated to civic nationalism. Its vexillology reflected a 
redesign of the second national flag, rejiggering its color scheme and adding a Mesopotamian 
icon to its central panel. Its heraldry was an elaborate armorial achievement based upon 
 
105 Historical Dictionary of Iraq, s.v., “Arab Union.”  
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twentieth-century socialist designs. Though the Free Officers’ representations only lasted a 
handful of years, it denoted the first instance of Iraqi iconography unencumbered by the baggage 
of colonial paternalism.  
 The Ba’th Party completed its takeover of Iraq in 1968 when Abdul Rahman Arif was 
removed as president. It marked the end of a decade of vacillation between leaders of varying 
levels of commitment to Pan-Arabism. Under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, who assumed 
full control of Iraq in 1979, the country accelerated its drive towards preeminence within the 
Arab world. Though Iraq’s attempted a union with Egypt and Syria failed in 1963, its state 
iconography reflected a willingness to increase its international profile. In 1980, Iraq brawled 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran during the catastrophic Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), marking a 
return of trenches and poisonous gas to battlefields reminiscent of World War I. This period and 
subsequent decades demonstrated the incredible capacity of Iraqis to endure hardship. In 1990, a 
daring invasion of Kuwait placed Saddam on a collision course with the United States and 
established the preconditions for the Iraq War twelve years later.  It was during the Gulf War 
which Hussein modified the Iraqi flag with the takbir of Islam, the well-known allahu akbar 
(God is Great). The convention remains on the Iraqi flag into the present, fourteen years after 
Saddam met the gallows in 2006.  
 
 Vexillology of Republican Iraq (1959 – 1963) 
Similar to the Arab Revolt model, Iraq’s third national flag was a product of rebellion. In 1958, 
after successfully storming the royal palace in Baghdad and overthrowing Faisal II, the Free 
Officers remade symbols of state authority with vivacity. Unlike the previous military uprisings 
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under Bakr Sidqi (1936) and Rashid Ali (1941), the Free Officers’ coup d’état permanently 
dislocated the Hashemites from power in Iraq. To demonstrate the ancien régime’s capitulation, 
its successor government selected national symbols that communicated a new chapter in Iraqi 
history. 106 Therefore, the Free Officers’ vexillography reflected a necessary differentiation 
between the defunct Iraqi monarchy and its newborn republic. Through its iconography, the junta 
advanced the discourse of Iraqi identity, rejected the perceived kowtowing of the Hashemite 
kings, and advanced a vision of civic nationalism. The Republican flag, which served from 1958 
to 1963, permitted the Free Officers to denounce Hashemite rule while simultaneously inventing 
symbols of state authority Iraqi citizens would not reject.  
Though it dissented from the previous Arab Revolt-inspired design, the Republican flag 
was conventional by twentieth-century vexillological norms.107 Similar post-World War II 
patterns included Canada, Cameroon, Mongolia, and Moldova. 108 The banner consisted of three 
vertical panels colored black, white, and green (see Figure 3.1). The Free Officers amended the 
four-color convention devised during the Second Constitutional Era by adding yellow, a hue 
associated with Kurds.109  In the center (white) panel was a two-piece icon, a golden circle inside 
of a crimson eight-pointed star. This feature was an intentional inclusion of Mesopotamian 
symbolism designed to evoke an Iraqi identity independent of ethno-confessional groups. Like 
its predecessor, the Republican flag maintained the 1:2 aspect ratio dictated under Article IV of 
the Organic Law.  
 
106 Michael Eppel, Iraq from Monarch to Tyranny: From the Hashemites to the Rise of Saddam (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 2004), 147-149.  
107 “Republic of Iraq: 195-1963,” Flags of the World, database, accessed March 27, 2020, 
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Figure 3.1 – The national flag of the Republic of Iraq (1959-63).  110 
 
Iraqi Republican Flag Semiotics (1959-1963) 
This section considers the intersection of Mesopotamian identity with Iraqi notions of Arabness 
and Kurdishness. Though the banner’s color convention evoked Arabs (black, white, green, and 
red) and Kurds (yellow), its Mesopotamian elements require in-depth analysis. The Republican 
flag’s semiotics reflected the predicament of post-Hashemite governance. Iraqi national symbols 
needed to unmoor from Hashemite memory to better communicate Qasim’s centralization of 
state authority. On the justification of the Free Officers’ actions, Michael Eppel explained, 
“…the social transformation vital to the survival of Iraq and its extrication from the swamp of 
 





backwardness could not be accomplished from within the regime.” 111  Therefore, to message a 
unitary and forward-looking Iraq, the junta modified national vexillography, maintaining 
desirable elements of Arab identity while redoubling representations of ethnic unity. In addition 
to its nationalist color scheme, the Mesopotamian icon was an attempt to triangulate diverse 
ethnicities into a historicized and pre-Islamic framework.  
As with the Hashemites, the Free Officers struggled to maintain a balance between Arab 
preeminence and the integration of ethno-confessional subgroups. In 1958, the mere elimination 
of the Hashemite monarchy and its vestigial colonialism was insufficient to answer more 
profound questions about Iraqiness. In effect, Qasim needed to maneuver a diverse population 
between two civic orientations, watanī and qawmī, competing versions of nationalism with 
profound implications. 112 The Pan-Arabism or qawmiyya, of the 1950s and 1960s existed in a 
broader context of a global movement towards non-alignment during the Cold War. 113 While 
Third Worldism and other radical ideologies persisted in Iraq during this period, Qasim feared 
Pan-Arabist inclinations would embolden Nasser. 114 Qasim favored the opposite nationalist 
orientation, watanī, stressing a broader patriotism centered upon the geographic limitations of 
Iraq.  
A rejection of Pan-Arabism did not guarantee the acquiescence of ethno-confessional 
minorities. The significant Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkmen populations around Mosul resisted 
integration into mainstream Iraqi society. Thirty-two years following the Treaty of Ankara 
(1926), the assimilation of ethnic minorities still overshadowed domestic policy. The issue was 
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explicitly addressed throughout the 1958 Interim Constitution in several articles relating to Arab-
Kurdish relations, touting their partnership while reiterating the centrality of Iraqi Arabs. 115  The 
document stated in part, “The Iraqi structural is based on cooperation of principles between its 
citizens and respecting their rights and maintaining their freedom. Arabs and Kurds are 
considered partners in this country w[h]ere the constitution will state their nation rights under 
Arab unity.” 116 This constitutional element was intended to dampen inclinations towards 
Kurdish semi-autonomy, a sticking point that resulted in the First Iraqi-Kurdish War (1961-70). 
The conflict outlasted the Free Officers and preset the conditions for further violence in Northern 
Iraq, something antithetical to nationalization efforts after 1958. 117   
Though its efforts proved futile, the Qasim regime marked the first instance of an Iraqi 
government’s attempt to engender a deeper Mesopotamian identity through vexillography. 118 
The Free Officers’ fabrication, an eight-pointed star and disk, evoked the celestial motifs popular 
in Babylonian carvings. Familiar during the Kassite dynasty (c. 1531 – 1155 BCE), kudurru 
were polished oblong stones used to adjudicate the boundaries and land grants of Babylonian 
rulers. 119 The stones were oftentimes embossed with Mesopotamian deities’ icons implying 
divine endorsement of terrestrial governance. 120  For example, the uppermost panel of the 
Kudurru of King Melishipak II (Figure 3.2) featured, “ The crescent of Sin, the moon god, and 
the star set with the rays of Shamash, the sun god, flank the goddess Ishtar, represented by the 
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planet Venus.” 121  Both Shammash and Ishtar were represented by eight-pointed figures 
throughout Mesopotamian artwork, though the goddess’ icon was oftentimes encircled to better 
resemble Venus. Whether this represented a flexible association of celestial bodies between 
Shamash and Ishtar is unclear since the latter had a strong association with Venus. 122 In 1959, 
the specifics of the Mesopotamian pantheon were superfluous as Iraqi iconography only needed 
a thin association with an imagined past.  
 
Figure 3.2 – Comparison of the Kudurru of King Meli-shipak II (c. 1186-1172 BCE) and the 
Kudurru of Nebuchadnezzar I (c. 1125 – 1104 BCE). 123  
 
121 “Kudurru of King Melishipak II, limestone stele, 1186-1172 BCE, Louvre Museum, accessed March 31, 2020, 
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Like Romulus and Remus’ mythic founding of Rome in 750 BCE, of which fifteenth-
century Byzantines could dwell in imagined continuity, the Free Officers’ implication was not 
literally true. 124 Instead, it was a nationalist advertising campaign endeavoring to influence a 
diverse population to adopt a new, transhistorical identity rooted in old Mesopotamia. The 
situation of a twentieth-century national mythos within an ancient milieu required Iraqis to 
assume a metaphysical relationship with pre-Islamic peoples of yore. To remain consistent with 
Qasim’s tendency towards wataniya, the state employed a palatable iconography on its flag, one 
drawn from a limited pool of neutral symbols with plausible historicity. Outwardly, Republican 
vexillography needed to reject Pan-Arabism while broadcasting Iraqi neutrality towards regional 
and global powers. 125 This semiotic neutrality was also disseminated inwardly; by employing an 
innocuous Mesopotamian icon, the Republican flag implied a universal in-group suitable for all 
Iraqis regardless of ethnic or confessional identity. 
The conceptual semiotic model outlined in Table 3.1 illustrates the gradation of potential 
Iraqi identities the Republican flag messaged. While it considers coterminous Arab, 
Mesopotamian, and Kurdish identities, other Iraqi subnational components such as Assyrians or 
Turkmen are analyzable. Zones A, B, F, and G refers to Iraqi Arabs who subscribed to varying 
degrees of non-Arab identity. For example, Zone A describes those Arabs uninterested in the 
Free Officers’ egalitarian vision, while Zone B were those Iraqis holding opposite views. Kurds 
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include persons of mixed ethnicity or perhaps Kurds living in Arab provinces. 126  Zones B, C, D, 
and G show Iraqis professing a predominantly Mesopotamian lineage regardless of their ethnic 
identities before 1959. Since Mesopotamian identity was a product of twentieth-century Iraqi 
nationalism it seems improbable many embraced this category. Under Saddam Hussein, the 
Ba’thi government undertook a robust program of Mesopotamiaization which dwarfed the Free 
Officers’ vexillographic offering. 127  If anything, Iraqis which front-loaded a pre-Islamic identity 
were Assyrians, an indigenous ethnicity rooted in ancient Mesopotamia who needed no reminder 
of Iraq’s remote past. 128   
 
Table 3.1 – Conceptual semiotic model of potential Iraqi identities messaged under the 
Republican flag (c. 1959 – 1963).  
 
126 Jennifer Roy and Ali Fadhil, Playing Atari with Saddam Hussein (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018). 
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Description of Iraqi Heraldry (1959 – 1963) 
Like its vexillography, Iraqi heraldry under the Free Officers communicated a rejection of 
Hashemite authority in 1958. Though less ostentatious than its predecessor, the Free Officers’ 
arms revisited comparable themes of Iraqiness dating from the 1930s. Under legislation passed in 
1959, the “Emblem of the Iraq Republic” was described as:  
The Emblem of the Iraqi Republic shall consist of a circle from which eight 
beams diffuse. Each beam consists of three stretchings, the colour of golden 
yellow. Between every two beams a deep red projection of a star emerges. Amidst 
th[a]t circle a blue area exists. In the centre of which there is a golden spike 
surrounded by a black wheel with eight rectangular projections at the inner side, 
encircled by a white ring that extends till the black circumference. In the middle 
of this white ring there is an Arabic sword that embraces the wheel at the left 
hand-side, and a Kurdish dagger that embraces it at the right hand-side. Between 
their two tops the phrase ‘THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ’ shall be written in Kufi 
writing, and between their hilts there is written the phrase ‘JULY 14’ and ‘1958’ 
underneath, in Kufi writing, too. The colour of the sword, the dagger and the Kufi 
writing is black. 129 
 
In addition to removing its British-backed monarchy, Baghdad’s remake of its national arms was 
a criticism of European-inspired heraldry and a turn towards socialist iconography. Decorated 
with Mesopotamian symbols, Iraqi arms under the Free Officers complemented the imagined 
pre-Islamic identity of the Republican flag. Rather than reiterate this aspect of Iraqi wataniya, 
this section focuses on modern symbols embedded in Iraqi heraldry from 1959 to the Ba’thi 
ascendency during 1963.  
 
 






Figure 3.3 – National arms of the Republic of Iraq (c 1959 – 1963). 130 
 
Beyond the eight-pointed sunbursts of Shamash, the remaining symbols represented a 
range of conventions employed on national heraldry throughout history and without a distinctly 
Iraqi provenance. As in Hashemite heraldry, the escutcheon featured dual melee weapons, 
though the Free Officers’ revision imparted Arab and Kurdish symbolism on its blades. These 
weapons replaced the dual seven-pointed stars stipulated in 1925 under the Organic Law and 
which culminated in the 1931 release of the Hashemite achievement of arms. 131 While not 
officially sanctioned through legislation, the wheat and cogwheel represented Iraqi industry and 
 
130 Iraq 4, digital facsimile, Heraldry of the World, database, accessed April 7, 2020 https://www.heraldry-
wiki.com/heraldrywiki/index.php?title=File:Iraq4.jpg. 
131 Iraq Government Gazette 28, June 7, 1931.  
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agricultural abundance.132 Iraq’s economy transitioned from agriculture to oil extraction decades 
before the Abd al-Karim Qasim seized control, receiving its initial royalty in 1927. 133 Finally, 
the national motto and commemorative date surrounding the escutcheon memorialized the Free 
Officers’ coup (July 14th, 1958) and the country’s official name, the Republic of Iraq, al-
jumhūryyia al-iraqiyya. 134 
 
Semiotics of Iraqi Heraldry (1959 – 1963) 
This section considers the semiotics of Iraq’s short-lived heraldry under Qasim’s government 
from its creation in 1959 to replacement in 1963. If its armorial representations were mild 
reconfigurations of Hashemite arms, what was the purpose of the Free Officers’ remake of Iraqi 
national iconography? There were two messages Iraqi heraldry conveyed after the monarchy’s 
downfall in 1958. Since the Free Offices envisioned a burgeoning stability following their July 
14th Revolution, the first notion communicated on the Republican arms was the consolidation of 
state authority, administration, and governance. 135 Second, Abd al-Karim Qasim transmitted an 
aspirational message concerning economic equality and justice, a common theme in twentieth-
century socialist heraldry. The Free Officers’ arms communicated that Iraq would mature and 
flourish under Qasim and an ascendant watanīya.  
 
132 Symes, “The First Banknotes of the Central Bank of Iraq.” In the legislation the wheat is described as a “golden 
spike.”  
133 Abbas Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq: Oil, Wars, Destruction of Development and Prospects, 1950 -2010, 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 17.  
134 Symes, “The First Banknotes of the Central Bank of Iraq.” 
135 Avshalom H. Rubin, “Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Kurds of Iraq: Centralization, Resistance and Revolt, 1958–
63,” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 3 (May 2007): 352-382.  
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The insurgent Free Officers were instantly transformed into incumbents when the ancien 
régime was toppled in 1958. Previous military dictators, Bakr Sidqi (1936) and Rashid Ali 
(1941), maintained the monarchy and kept Iraqi iconography intact. 136  In both examples, 
Hashemite ministers regained control of Iraq and initiated a restoration, something impossible 
after Faisal II’s death. Though Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Free Officers toppled the 
Hashemites, their rule required consolidation; the interim constitution, national flag, and 
revamped heraldry were designed to assist the concentration of power in Baghdad. 137 The new 
regime had numerous enemies within Iraq, including unruly Kurds, conspiratorial Ba’thi, and 
former Hashemite loyalists infuriated by Faisal’s regicide. Sixty years later, one courtier 
considered the incident in light of other turbulent Iraqi regimes, “There is a big difference 
between yesterday and today - in terms of the security we had but also in terms of ethics, honour 
and leadership. All of the horrors of the coup are a black spot on Iraq’s history.” 138 To 
consolidate its gains, the Free Officers needed all Iraqis to understand the termination of the 
Hashemite state, the inauguration of a new republic, and Qasim’s plenipotentiary power.  
 Many Republican symbols rehashed values and messages communicated under 
Hashemite authority. In several cases, the 1959 model employed facsimiles of its predecessor’s 
symbolism, substituting the Free Officers’ motto and commemorative date around the 
escutcheon. 139 Figure 3.4 highlights this changeover; “The Republic of Iraq” (al-jumhūryyia al-
iraqiyya) replaced the previous slogan “justice is the foundation of property” (al-adlu asa’ul 
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mulk). The panel bearing “14 July 1958” (١٤ tammūz ١٩٥٨) replaced the previous hijiri date of 
Faisal I’s coronation “1339” (١٣٣٩), a switcheroo loaded with republican meaning. By 
proclaiming the Republic of Iraq was founded in 1958, the Free Officers memorialized the 
downfall of the monarchy and nullified the events of the previous decades. The replacement 
slogan cemented the official nomenclature of Iraqi republicanism, and the motto al-jumhūryyia 
al-iraqiyya is maintained into the present, one of a handful of lasting contributions to Iraqi 
iconography dating to 1959. 140  
 
Figure 3.4 – A comparison of commemorative dates and mottos on Iraqi heraldry between the 
Free Officer and the Hashemite regimes (c. 1931 – 1963).  
The Republican arms also employed socialist symbols common throughout twentieth-
century postcolonial and Soviet-aligned heraldry. This was a troublesome design choice as 
Qasim objected to establishing a partnership with left-leaning intellectuals, the Iraqi Communist 
 
140 While the motto “al-jumhūryyia al-iraqiyya “ was included on subsequent arms, the 1958 date was omitted.  
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Party (ICP), and Moscow. 141 Figure 3.5 highlights additional socialist arms, including the 
Mongolian People’s Republic, Laos, Angola, the Hungarian People’s Republic, and the German 
Democratic Republic. These emblems often featured five-pointed stars and symbols of bountiful 
agriculture and industry. Farming implements, subsistence crops, hammers, and cogwheels were 
common motifs throughout the twentieth century; the well-known hammer and sickle of the 
Soviet Union was a salient example. 142 Whether the sunburst of Shamash intentionally emulated 
communist star symbolism is unclear. Though the Mesopotamian iconography was 
disproportionate to contemporary socialist designs, the sunburst shared a communist (red and 
gold) color scheme. 143    
That Iraqi arms lacked an unambiguous communist flair reflected Abd al-Karim Qasim’s 
ambitions of diplomatic neutrality. Having rejected colonialism, the Free Officers were 
uninterested in close relations with Moscow or encouraging home-grown radicals. 144  Though 
Qasim earlier adopted a friendly relationship with the ICP, the relationship soured, and Iraq’s 
generalissimo sought to affect the image of the republic’s indispensable leader. 145 Therefore, the 
Republican arms reflected Qasim’s objective of consolidating power without foreign 
interference. 146 Without a clear connection to global communism, the heraldic devices were 
platitudes to ensure Iraqis understood the regime respected its working class, whether they toiled 
as farmers or roughnecks. Hence, the official stance that the sunburst meant, “The liberty, which 
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Iraq regained by the July 14 Revolution by the time of sunrise,” from a semiotic, diplomatic, and 
archaeological standpoint was untrue. 147 
 
Figure 3.5 – Assorted twentieth-century socialist heraldry. Top row (from left to right): People’s 
Republic of Mongolia (1960 – 92), Laos (1992 – Pres.), and Angola (1992 – Pres.). Bottom row 
(from left to right): The Republic of Iraq (1959-63), Hungarian People’s Republic (1949 – 56), 




147 Symes, “The First Banknotes of the Central Bank of Iraq.” 
148 “Mongolia” Heraldry of the World, database, accessed April 11, 2020, https://www.heraldry-
wiki.com/heraldrywiki/index.php?title=Mongolia. “Laos,” Heraldry of the World, database, accessed April 11, 
2020, https://www.heraldry-wiki.com/heraldrywiki/index.php?title=Laos. “Angola,” Heraldry of the World, 
database, accessed April 11, 2020, https://www.heraldry-
wiki.com/heraldrywiki/index.php?title=National_Arms_of_Angola. Thommy, Coat of Arms of Hungary 1949 – 56), 
digital facsimile, WikiCommons, accessed April 11, 2020, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coat_of_arms_of_Hungary#/media/File:Coat_of_arms_of_Hungary_(1949-1956).svg. 




Iraqi Republican Vexillology (1963 – 2003) 
The Ramadan Revolution in February 1963 marked Iraq’s pivot towards the Ba’th Party and 
greater engagement in regional politics. 149 During the uprising Qasim was captured and 
murdered by Ba’thi rebels following numerous firefights throughout the capital between 
government forces and insurgents. The cornerstone of Abd al-Karim Qasim’s governance, 
diplomatic neutrality and a centralized power base in Baghdad was abandoned.150 After the 
Ramadan Revolution, a junta under General Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and other Ba’th Party 
notables endeavored to unite Iraq, Syria, and Egypt under a resurrected United Arab Republic 
(UAR). 151 In anticipation of an eventual unification, Iraq adopted a uniform vexillography 
grounded in Egyptian design. 152 Iraq’s fourth national banner replaced the Republican flag, 
though Ba’thi ascendancy was thwarted in November 1963 and forced underground. The Free 
Officers returned under the leadership of the Arif brothers, Abdul Salam (1963-66) and Abdul 
Rahman (1966 - 68), both admirers of Nasser and Pan-Arabism. Since its overall political 
orientation remained unchanged, Iraq’s 1963 vexillography persisted, extending beyond 1968 
when the Ba’th Party regained control. 153   
The design change represented a return to a conventional flag pattern and remained a 
staple of Arab vexillography from the 1950s onward. 154 The flag’s aspect ratio returned to its 
pre-Mandate proportions (1:2), increasing to 2:3, a dimension that remains into the present on the 
Iraqi, Syrian, and Egyptian flags. In an admission that Kurdish peace remained elusive, the 
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second Republican flag eliminated yellow from its palette, returning to an Arab Revolt tricolor 
(red, white, and black). There was a trio of green five-pointed stars in the central (white) panel, 
each symbolizing a constituent subcomponent of the defunct United Arab Republic. Though the 
three republics never merged, the stars remained on Iraq’s flag and their symbolism was 
reimagined from the transnationalism to the three precepts of the Ba’th Party: unity, freedom, 
and socialism. 155 The Iraqi flag remained in this configuration until 1991, employed for twenty-
seven years without a modification, and became the second longest-serving flag after the banner 




Figure 3.6 – Iraqi Republican flag (1963 – 1991). 156 
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Figure 3.7 – Iraqi flag with takbir in Saddam Hussein’s handwriting. 157 
 
In 1991 the Iraqi flag underwent another essential modification, the addition of the takbir 
of Islam, allahu akbar, written in Saddam Hussein’s handwriting. The change occurred on the 
eve of the Gulf War, in what Saddam called “the Mother of All Battles.” 158 While Hussein was 
an observant Muslim, under his rulership, the republic was predominantly secular and refrained 
from pursuing a religious agenda until 1991. Throughout the Islamicate world, most national 
flags eschew religious slogans, notable acceptations including Saudi Arabia and Somaliland. 
Regardless of confessional identity, there are vexillological reasons to keep phrases off a national 
flag relating to identifiability. According to vexillologist Ted Kaye, “A flag is a graphic symbol. 
Lettering is nearly impossible to read from a distance, hard to sew, and difficult to reduce to 
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lapel-pin size.” 159 In the 1991 example, Hussein wanted to communicate an imperiled Iraq, one 
needing divine assistance against an overwhelming military response to Kuwait’s invasion. 
Though the takbir contained a profound religious connotation, its addition to the Iraqi was more 
public relations than piety.  
 
Iraqi Republican Flag Semiotics (1963 – 2003) 
The meaning of the Iraqi flag evolved during this period, corresponding to increasing levels of 
sacrifice and discomfort for Iraqis. When the Ba’thi militia overthrew the Free Officers in 1963, 
the ensuing diplomatic reorientation undertaken by Iraq and its attempted entrance into the 
United Arab Republic marked its emergence onto the world stage. In previous decades, Iraq was 
either sheltered under an umbrella of British military might or committed to non-alignment under 
Qassim. In redesigning its flag along Egyptian lines, Baghdad communicated a willingness to 
identify with republics of ethnic affiliation. During the late-twentieth century, Iraq advanced its 
self-conceptualization beyond membership to preeminence, as it tackled the “Persian Menace” of 
Iran, ostensibly to protect all Arabs. In the decade following the downfall of the Ba’th Party, 
some Iraqis recalled with pride the overwhelming casualties its military forces incurred 
throughout the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and the Gulf War (1991). 160 Yet crippling sanctions and 
an unstable geostrategic climate after 9/11 forced Iraq into another confrontation with the United 
States.  
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The notion of watanīya, whether Iraqiness was a matter of association between persons of 
shared civic identity, was distressed after 1963. Ironically, it was armed Kurdish resistance to 
Qasim’s nationalism, which permitted his overthrow. While the army was committed in the First 
Iraqi-Kurdish War (1961-70), the Ba’thi uprising took advantage of a diminished military 
presence around Baghdad. 161 The two events were not coordinated but highlighted the 
precarious position wataniya nationalism placed Iraq. Baghdad was simultaneously transitioning 
to a Pan-Arab diplomatic stance while attempting to engender patriotism by force. 162 The war 
shattered hopes of civic nationalism, and a peace settlement in 1970 created a semiautonomous 
Kurdistan, codified in another interim constitution. Article 5 read “(a) Iraq is a part of the Arab 
Nation. (b) The Iraqi People are composed of two principal nationalisms: the Arab Nationalism 
and the Kurdish Nationalism.” 163 Though the Ba’thi government was uninterested in ethnic 
supremacy, its vexillography mirrored the genuineness of divisions between Arabs and Kurds.  
The association of Arabness with the Iraqi state reached its zenith during the 1980s. 
Though Iraqi vexillography was unchanged during this decade, national identity was transformed 
through a violent confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mobilizing ten percent of the 
prewar male population, the Iran-Iraq War exposed Iraqi troops to tremendous casualties with 
200,000 killed, 400,000 wounded, and 70,000 taken prisoner.164 The war and Ba’thi nationalism 
became commingled as Dina Rizk Khoury explained: 
The war experience and its meaning became the cornerstone of the Iraqi state’s attempts 
to transform the Iraqi self, particularly, the male self. Attempts at shaping the public 
culture of heroism and manliness and of death and mourning were regulated in 
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incorporating war celebrations with commemoration rituals under the purview of 
neighborhood party officials. 165  
 
If the Ba’th Party existed to advance the interests and prosperity of Arabs, then the Iran-Iraq War 
and its attendant symbolism were expressions of Pan-Arabism in wartime. Saddam Hussein and 
the Ba’th Party, therefore, assigned an anti-Persian meaning to the endurance of its soldiers on 
Iranian and Iraqi battlefields. While this propaganda effort perhaps had limited effectiveness, the 
Iranian bombardment of Iraqi cities and Tehran’s instigation of a Kurdish insurgency only 
reinforced the thesis. 166 
Saddam harbored these views for decades, expounding upon his opinions during 
prolonged interrogations by the Central Intelligence Agency after his capture by American forces 
in 2003. 167 John Nixon, one of Hussein’s numerous interrogators later recalled, “Saddam truly 
saw himself as the guardian of Arab against the Persian menace. Because of this, he said, the 
world saw Iraqis as the “‘most noble people.’” 168 Another interrogation session included a litany 
of 548 acts of war Iran committed before to 1980, in which Saddam recited from memory. 169 To 
the Ba’th Party behind the lines, the 200,000 fatalities were martyrs, shaheed of Iranian 
belligerence, and worthy of epic memorialization. The nexus of the Iran-Iraq War, remembrance, 
and vexillology met during the 1983 unveiling of the Shaheed Monument complex. It consisted 
of “…a circular platform, 190 meters in diameter, floating over an underground museum and 
carrying a 40-metre high split dome.” 170 In the center of the monument resided an enormous 
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Iraqi flag, rendered in twisted metal and intimating the union of sacrifice and state. Though anti-
Iranian sentiments evolved since 1988, the memorial remains into the present, a palimpsest with 
successive iterations of the national flag repainted after 1991, 2004, and 2008. 171  
The Iran-Iraq War crippled Iraq’s economy and was a direct contribution to Saddam’s 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. 172 Before the encounter, Baghdad leveled a bevy of accusations 
against Kuwait, including oil market manipulation and unscrupulous sovereign debt practices. 173 
The 1990 conquest and occupation of Kuwait provoked a massive deployment of international 
troops under the leadership of United States president George Bush. Days before the allied 
assault, Bush wrote to Saddam attempting to stimulate an Iraqi retreat and said in part, “That 
most Arab and Muslim countries are arrayed against you as well should reinforce what I am 
saying. Iraq cannot and will not be able to hold on to Kuwait or exact a price for leaving.” 174  In 
electing to add the takbir (God is Great) to the Iraqi flag in January 1991, Saddam reimagined 
the invasion of Kuwait along religious lines, to communicate to the Arab and Muslim states Bush 
referenced. In his wartime speech, “The Mother of all Battles,” Hussein vocalized this sentiment 
as, “We in Iraq will be the faithful and obedient servants of God, struggling for his sake to raise 
the banner of truth and justice, the banner of “God is Great.” Accursed be the lowly.” 175 This 
last-minute declaration of public piety was confusing as Saddam Hussein spent much of his 
administration suppressing religious factions inside Iraq. John Esposito pointed out this 
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inconsistency, noting it was curious that Saddam would “…cloak himself in the mantle of Islam 
and call for a jihad.” 176 
If a legitimate expression of piety was unlikely, what then was the purpose of this 
midnight hour modification of Iraqi vexillography? By 1988 Iraq, the preeminent military power 
in the Middle East, incurred hundreds of thousands of casualties checking Iranian power, 
presumably to the benefit of Gulf states like Kuwait. 177 Saddam wanted a tremendous degree of 
financial compensation after the Iran-Iraq War, something akin to the Marshall Plan to rebuild 
Europe following World War II. 178 When diplomatic relations with Kuwait soured in 1990, Iraq 
invaded yet still retained a presupposition of moral superiority. When the blunder of this 
argument became apparent, Saddam recast the Iraqi military and holy warriors heroically 
engaging atheistic Westerners and traitorous Arabs. To Saddam, the handwritten takbir 
encapsulated his tenure as a leader and his willingness to gamble with Iraq’s future in 1991. 
Therefore, the takbir did not communicate a private confessional message, but was a 
propagandistic statement highlighting inherent goodness, decency, and selflessness of Iraqis 
unjustly maligned by duplicitous forces.  
 
 
176 John Esposito, “Islam and the Gulf War,” in The Saddam Hussein Reader, New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 
2002, 303.  
177 This is something a conjecture as Israeli military power was similarly potent during this period. While Iraq had a 
deep bench of battle-tested soldiers and commanders, Israel possessed a professional army and a superior airpower 
to say nothing of unwavering US support from friendly administrations dating back to the Truman.  




Figure 3.8 – The Shaheed Monument in Baghdad (c. 2015). 179 
 
Description of Iraqi Heraldry (1965 – Present) 
The heraldry of Iraq from 1965 onward mirrored common themes throughout its vexillology. 
Similar to the proposed banner of the reconstituted United Arab Republic, its constituents 
adopted a common armorial representation rooted in Arab history. Beginning in 1965, Iraq 
abandoned the elaborate pastiche of the Free Officers’ design, choosing a streamlined model 
resembling the national emblems of other republics throughout the world. 180 The arms consisted 
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of a single oversized eagle supporter representing Saladin (Salah ad-Din), the twelfth-century 
Ayyubid sultan linked to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. On the eagle’s breast, a tapered escutcheon 
portrayed the UAR banner, displayed vertically. 181 To maintain continuity with its 
vexillography, Iraq updated its heraldic shield after 1991, 2004, and 2008 whenever the flag was 
modified. Finally, the eagle’s claws clutched a scroll bearing the republic’s name in Arabic, al-




Figure 3.9 – Iraqi national arms under the Ba’th Party (c. 1965 – 1991). 182 
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Semiotics of Iraqi Heraldry (1965 – Present)  
Under the proposed United Arab Republic, a heraldic association with Saladin ensured the 
broadcastability of a message with maxim plausibility. The eagle’s employment as Iraqi political 
iconography referenced its presence on the Citadel of Cairo, a massive twelfth-century 
stronghold constructed by Saladin. 183 From a semiotic standpoint, Saladin’s biography was ideal 
for communicating Iraqi identity during this period. He was born in Tikrit, near Saddam 
Hussein’s birthplace, and was ethnically Kurdish, permitting a broader semiotic association. As 
with its Mesopotamian symbolism, Saladin’s eagle theoretically allowed a widespread 
association with the Ba’th Party. Baghdadi politicos could employ this symbolism as an 
aspirational icon, comingling Iraq’s unruly minority with Arab hero-worship. Like the sunburst 
of Shamash, the thoughtfulness of a mixed Arab-Kurdish metaphor could not persuade 
peshmerga fighters (uninterested in Iraqi nationalism) to disarm and seek peace with Baghdad.  
 The inclusion of mythic figures on national arms has a long history. For example, Greek 
heraldry used Hercules to support its escutcheon from 1864 to 1924; the royal arms of the United 
Kingdom feature a unicorn (Figure 2.11). 184  The utility of Saladin’s eagle was better enjoyed by 
Iraqi Arabs than Kurds. In making a Kurdish hero the national symbol of Iraq, the Ba’thi 
government communicated a desire to reconcile the discrepancy of Iraqi and Kurdish 
nationalism; yet the conflict continued. Therefore, its inability to broadcast anything beyond the 
Arab-led administration of Iraq was rooted in governance, not symbolism. Today, the point is 
sidelined by more significant political strife in Iraq. However, the eagle enjoys placement on the 
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heraldry of Egypt and Palestine, two polities also connected with Saladin through Arab 
governance rather than ethnicity.  
Conclusion 
Iraq faced tremendous political transformation during the mid-twentieth century and produced a 
bevy of national iconography reflecting its conversion from a British-aligned monarchy to an 
Iraqi republic. The severance of its Hashemite dynasty forced Iraq to confront inconsistencies in 
its national identity rooted in an unidentifiable placement for its ethnic minorities. This problem 
was compounded in the absence of clearly understood measures of Iraqiness. In one sense, a 
broad civic nationalism obliged Iraqi citizens to reconceptualize a sense of belonging around an 
identity without defined boundaries. National iconography under the Free Officers attempted to 
circumvent the absence of a historical Iraq by appropriating Mesopotamian imagery associated 
with Shamash, a sun god.  These symbols were employed on both the Republican flag in its 
central panel and on Iraqi heraldry, mixed with socialist icons.  
This trend was short-lived and Iraqi iconography from 1963 onwards referenced Pan-
Arabism with slight nods towards Kurdish ethnicity in mild employment of watanīya. 1991 and 
the Gulf War witnessed a dramatic modification of the Iraqi flag, with the addition of takbir 
written in Saddam’s handwriting. The declaration of divine supremacy, prevalent in Islam, was 
repurposed to highlight Iraqi suffering and victimization after the Iran-Iraq War. Iraqi heraldry 
during this period focused on a metaphysical link to Saladin, which transcended history and 
permitted Iraqis placement in a Pan-Arabist milieu. With minor revisions, the 1960s observed the 
final iteration of Iraqi heraldic design and vexillography. Henceforth, modifications to its state 
symbols were mild reconfigurations that addressed contemporary matters in the Iraqi body 
politic without deleting its icons. In that the conversation about Iraqiness on visual 
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representations of state focused on smaller matters such as erasure of the takbir and the removal 
of its stars, questions Iraq tackled in 2004 and 2008.  




This chapter considers modifications to the Iraqi flag during the twenty-first century, beginning 
with the dissolution of the Ba’th Party in 2003 and ending with the downfall of the Islamic State 
in 2017. The topping of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 created a power-vacuum in Baghdad 
which the Americans filled until a viable Iraqi government was established in 2004. The 
subsequent Shi’i dominated administration pursued a policy of de-Ba’thification, marginalizing 
millions of Iraqis in the process. The parliament undertook aggressive means of modifying the 
national flag to remove vestigial Ba’thi symbolism, meeting roadblocks from Sunnis and failing 
to overcome the practical limitations of vexillography. In 2004, Iraqis overwhelmingly rejected a 
unity flag intended to evoke feelings a civic nationalism. Ultimately, the modification process 
was gradual, taking years to complete. It began with the removal of Saddam Hussein’s takbir in 
2004 and ended with the elimination of Ba’thi stars in 2008.  
 In 2014, Iraq faced a reinvigorated al-Qaeda, rebranded as the Islamic State and known 
for its black jihadi banner. The movement sought to unmake Iraq and subsume its identity within 
a Salafi-aligned supranational entity. Many Iraqis who supported the Islamic Sate were 
disaffected provincial Sunnis who rebelled against the Shi’i government in Baghdad. The 2000s 
witnessed an outbreak of ethno-sectarian violence during the American occupation which tore 
Iraq apart and undermined presuppositions about its identity. What did it mean to be an Iraqi in 
the twenty-first century? Two competing versions of Iraq were presented during this period. One 
proffered that Iraqis should imagine a future where ethnic, sectarian, and confessional 
distinctions were seemingly erased, but the reins of government were in Shi’i hands. The second 
version of identity under the Islamic State considered Iraq irredeemably corrupt and requiring 
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total revision. Between these two extremes, it was difficult to understand the trajectory of 
Iraqiness and some Sunnis longed for simpler times under Saddam Hussein. 185  
 
 
Figure 4.1 – The replacement flag proposed by the Interim Governing Council, designed by Rifat 
Chaderchi (c. 2004).  186 
 
Iraqi Vexillology (2004 to Present) 
Iraqi history took another major turn when the Anglo-American forces toppled Saddam Hussein 
and the Ba’th Party on April 9th, 2003. 187 A transitional ruling council was established under the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by US diplomat L. Paul Bremer. 188 The CPA and 
interim government arranged a host of renovations to Iraqi governance including attempts at a 
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new flag in 2004. During the previous year, Iraq maintained its national vexillography, replete 
with Saddam Hussein’s takbir. The inclination to terminate the national flag had numerous 
champions among American and Iraqi officials interested in separating Iraq from its Ba’thi past. 
189 The interim government impowered several Iraqi artists to fabricate a suitable replacement for 
the tricolor, producing a multitude of flags designs ranging from mild reconfigurations to a 
complete redesign. 190  
 Of the numerous replacement flags proposed in 2004 the most controversial was a unity 
banner designed by the founder of modern Iraqi architecture, Rifat Chaderchi. 191 Heedless of the 
longstanding animosity between Iraq and Israel, the Chaderchi design resembled the Zionist 
national flag, employing a bleached field with an oversized crescent moon. Underneath the icon, 
Chaderchi placed two ultramarine stipes symbolizing the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and like 
Free Officers’ golden circle in Shamash’s sunburst, a yellow strip represented Iraqi Kurds. 192  
For his part, Chaderchi maintained his design’s innocence insisting his instructions were to 
“…present Iraq as a Western country and to include references to the past. He said his inspiration 
was simple flags like those of Canada and Switzerland.” 193 Thought the utilization of geographic 
and minimalist designs is common among modern vexillography, notable examples including 
The Gambia and Nauru, the project was needlessly audacious. 194 It is unlikely an intellectual of 
Chaderchi’s stature was unaware his project resembled Israel’s flag. To further muddy the 
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waters, the architect’s design circumvented competition against other Iraqi artists due to 
Chaderchi’s brother’s position on the interim council. 195 
Though Chaderchi’s controversial redesign was rejected, the episode revealed that 
elements of Iraqi society wanted a national flag without an attachment to Saddam Hussein. A 
consensus to remove Saddam’s handwriting and replace the takbir emerged, as members as the 
interim council expressed discomfort in removing allahu akbar on religious grounds. As with the 
Gulf War modification, the 2004 takbir was a minor modification packed with significance. The 
Islamic proclamation received a makeover in Kufic script, a well-known Abbasid period Arabic 
calligraphy distinguished by its angular appearance and hailing from Iraq. 196 The Ba’thi three-
star pattern, color scheme, and aspect ratio remained in continuity with the 1991 revision. The 
release of the Kufic-modified flag occurred after the transition of power from the CPA to the 
Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in June 2004. 197  The planned dated was June 30th, however, to 
preempt retaliatory terrorist attacks, the United States granted Iraqi sovereignty two days early 
on June 28th, 2004. 198  
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Figure 4.2 – Iraqi national flag with Kufic takbir (c. 2004). 199 
 
The Kufic flag remained in service until 2008, when the Iraqi parliament enacted 
legislation stipulating the removal of the Ba’thi stars. Though a mere four years passed, Iraqi 
governance underwent a dramatic transformation as political power bases were realigned along 
ethno-sectarian lines. Under the 2005 constitution, the parliament’s seats were apportioned to 
previously unrepresented blocs, shifting power away from Sunnis and redirecting it towards Shi’i 
and Kurdish interests. 200 Article 12 of the constitution stipulated, “The flag, national anthem, 
and emblem of Iraq shall be regulated by law in a way that symbolizes the components of the 
Iraqi people.” 201 This impacted vexillography during 2008 when Kurdish politicians pushed for 
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a temporary redesign of the Iraqi national banner resulting a purge of its Ba’thi stars. 202 Sunni 
political parties such as the National Dialogue Front and the Accordance Front, favored a 
reimagined meaning of the stars from their Ba’thi connotation (unity, freedom, and socialism) to 
benign aspirational values. 203 The modification passed without serious opposition, save from a 
Shi’i bloc dedicated to Moqtada al-Sadr, who sought a postponement until a permanent design 
was agreed upon. 204  
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Iraq’s seventh national flag (c. 2008). 205 
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Semiotics of Iraqi Vexillology (2004 to Present) 
The final epoch of Iraqi vexillography faced questions of identity and governance similar in 
preceding decades. The topping of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’thi regime in 2003 opened a Pandora’s 
Box of ethno-sectarian enmity exemplified during the Iraq War (2003-11) and its successor 
conflict, the Iraqi Civil War (2014-17). During early 2003, the United States initiated a policy of 
de-Ba’thification were previous members of the ruling party were legally permitted from 
attaining positions in government. This greatly impacted the 2,000,000 party members and drove 
a wedge between Sunnis, the CPA, and later the Iraqi government. 206 While decisions about 
official representations of state were made in Baghdad, questions about Iraqiness were unsettled 
during a period of near-constant warfare. While civilians were under Iranian bombardment 
during the 1980s, the levels of the non-combatant casualties from 2003 to 2017 was 
unprecedented in Iraqi history. During this period over 200,000 civilians perished, adding to 
hundreds of thousands killed under Saddam Hussein in wars, insurrections, and political 
violence. 207 The new government altered previous ethno-sectarian arrangements, changing the 
calculus of Iraqi nationalism. Without Saddam or authoritarian rule, what would Iraqi identity 
mean in the twenty-first century?  
 Its controversy notwithstanding, Chaderchi’s design presented the first iteration of Iraqi 
post-Saddam Iraqiness. It was a forward-looking design, hopeful that ethnic unity was within 
reach following the downfall of the Iraqi strongman. Throughout his career, Chaderchi’s 
architecture consisted of vibrant, modernist designs which triangulated between traditionalist and 
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contemporary values. 208 His vexillography in 2004 shared a commitment to optimism which 
envisioned an Iraq unencumbered by ethno-confessional turbulence, a neo-wataniya harkening 
back to Iraq’s pre-Ba’thi commitment to civic nationalism. Like the Hashemite arms, 
Chaderchi’s flag attempted to communicate an identity based on geographic proximity to ancient 
waterways. While not intentionally subversive, the Chaderchi design implied an incipient 
identity which pressed Iraqis beyond their collective comfort-zone during a period a societal 
upheaval. Additionally, its association with the American-backed interim council tainted his 
vexillography, ensuring truculence from a broad swath of Iraqis.  
 In pushing the conversation beyond the boundaries of acceptability, the Chaderchi design 
set into motion the cornerstone of twenty-first century Iraqi vexillology – the question of 
Saddam. Of the countless Husseinian images destroyed during de-Ba’thification, Saddam’s 
takbir was the most difficult eradicate. Like all iconoclasm, a broken image cannot be destroyed, 
as the justification of removal is itself a partial recapitulation of the offensive image. 209 Consider 
the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas by the Talban in 2001 or the spate of Confederate statue 
removal in the United States in 2017. In both instances the offensive images’ nontertiary were 
enhanced because of removal efforts, sparking widespread condemnation and controversy. 210 In 
the case of the takbir, Islamic tradition further frustrated official attempts at de-Ba’thification as 
the memory of Saddam comingled with a declaration of divine supremacy. The Kufic 
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camouflage applied in 2004 was insufficient to calm Kurdish and Shi’i objections towards a 
continued Husseinian presence on the Iraq flag, hence the modification in 2008.  
 The removal of the Ba’thi stars in 2008 followed a period a tremendous violence and 
hardship for Iraqi citizens. The insurgency surpassed its highwater mark in 2007, as violence 
receded after waves of Iraqi troops, allied Sunni militia, and thousands of American 
reinforcements fanned into the countryside to overwhelm al-Qaeda strongholds. 211 Regardless of 
the protestation of Kurdish politicians, the 2008 vexillography occurred when favorable 
conditions on the battlefield made it politically possible to undertake another act of de-
Ba’thification. Though many Sunni militiamen defending Anbar province were angered by the 
stars’ removal, the frustration with Bagdad never came to blows. 212 Throughout Iraq, Sunnis 
who venerated Hussein made pilgrimages to his elaborate mausoleum in al-Awja, where his 
gravesite was festooned in the outlawed takbir banners, portraiture, and flowers. 213 There 
Saddam’s supporters could mourn the transformation of Iraq in a sacred space disconnected from 
the nation’s deep ethno-sectarian strife. The Iraqi government outlawed pilgrimages in 2009 
though it is unclear if this restriction was honored. 214 The mausoleum was destroyed by security 
forces fighting Islamic State fighters in 2015 and afterwards rumors circulated that Saddam 
loyalists removed his remains and cached for safekeeping. 215  
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Islamic State Vexillography (2014-2017) 
Perhaps the greatest change in Iraqi vexillography occurred in 2014 when the Islamic State of 
Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) conquered enormous tracts of territory in Northern Iraq and Eastern 
Syria. 216 At its apogee in late 2014, the Islamic State controlled over 45,000 square kilometer 
area the size of Denmark. 217 The organization was a reconstitution of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
which secreted underground following overwhelming force applied during the Surge. 218 The 
Islamic State instituted a totalitarian regime rooted in a literal interpretation of Islamic 
jurisprudence and under the leadership of a self-styled caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 219 
Baghdadi started his career in a Camp Bucca, a massive American detainee facility in 2004 
known for indoctrinating inmates in jihadi ideology. Al-Baghdadi was an intellectual trained in 
Islamic theology and demonstrated his bonafides to the leadership al-Qaeda inside Camp Bucca. 
220 He served in various positions in al-Qaeda during the Iraq War, never as battlefield 
commander, but as a spiritual advisor to AQI leadership. After several notable officers such as 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi were killed, al-Baghdadi gained control of the organization and 
reconstituted it. 221 
Dating to 2006, the Islamic State flag was a basic two-color design, sporting a black field 
and white calligraphy. 222 As with many jihadi organizations, the Islamic State’s flag featured the 
shahadah, the central confession of Islamic faith – “There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is 
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the messenger of Allah.” The shahadah is stylized with the first clause, “There is no god but 
Allah” written in white, while the second clause, “Muhammad is the messenger of Allah,” is 
written in black on a white seal. This vexillographic feature differed from other organizations 
such as the Taliban or al-Qaeda which used a traditional presentation of the shahadah with 
elaborate calligraphy, compared to the Islamic State’s Kufic script. 223 As a key element of ISIS 
propaganda revolved around multitudes of flags, this design choice reduced logistical burdens 
and permit ISIS fighters to manufacture battle-flags with black cloth and paint. Though official 
documentation from the Islamic State is unavailable, the flag’s aspect ratio appears as 2:3.   
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Semiotics of Islamic State Vexillology (2014-2017) 
The underlaying semiotics of the Islamic State’s vexillology differed from any previous Iraqi 
flag. In part to establish the legitimacy of the regime, the Islamic State fashioned a flag based in 
medieval history and employing a vexillographical layout common among jihadi groups. 225 
During the eighth century Khorasani rebels overthrew the Umayyads and established to Abbasid 
Caliphate in 750 CE. According to tradition the Abbasids employed black banners in fulfillment 
of an eschatological hadith, “(Armies carrying) the black flag will come from Khurasan. No 
power will be able to stop them, and they will finally reach Eela (Aqsa Mosque in in Jerusalem) 
where they will erect their flags.” 226 Though scholarly opinion differs in attributability to the 
Prophet Muhammad, the vexillography of the Islamic State was interested in broadcasting a 
message of intimidation. 227 Unlike previous national flags in Iraq, the black banners were 
focused on engendering compliance amongst Iraqis and Syrians living under its rule, hence the 
tremendous acts of torture committed by ISIS members. 228 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was not 
interested in refashioning Iraq as had Abd al-Karim Qasim or Saddam Hussein but unmaking it.  
 Its religious beliefs notwithstanding, the central political philosophy of the Islamic State 
was rooted in a presupposed illegitimacy of the Middle East under Sykes-Picot. In the well-
known propaganda film, “The End of Sykes-Picot,” an ISIS fighter wearing a dishdasha and a 
Kalashnikov, investigates a destroyed checkpoint on the Syrian-Iraqi border. 229 The unknown 
fighter saunters about the wreckage, denigrating Iraqi state and military iconography saying in 
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part, “This is the flag of Iraq. The flag of shirk. The Prophet Muhammad says, ‘whoever calls for 
nationality is not from me.’” 230 The English-speaking narrator expounds on the artificiality of 
boundaries in the Middle East, refers to al-Baghdadi as “the Breaker of Borders,” and raises a 
small ISIS flag over the checkpoint. 231 As with its flag, the film communicates the irredeemably 
of the present political system and its attendant governments in Damascus and Baghdad. The 
Islamic State’s dual message a of political reformation and righteousness gave the organizational 
flag a different semiotic quality than previous Iraqi banners.  
 From a semiotic standpoint, the flags of the Islamic State and the Arab Revolt share 
similar qualities. As rebel flags, both banners made promises about their respective worlds after 
the enemy was destroyed. In the Arab Revolt case, the Hashemites predicated a post-Ottoman 
state which reconstituted bygone caliphates under a Sharifian aegis. Believing colonialism was 
the source of corruption, the Islamic State wished to eradicate the boundaries established by 
Sykes-Picot and enact boarders of their choosing. Both were transhistorical identities rooted in 
the presupposition that duplicitous agents inhibited justice and necessitated violence for redress. 
Therefore, the underlying message communicated by the Islamic State was their ability to 
remake Iraq and Syria into something more suitable. Though reviled, the Islamic State was like 
the Hashemites, Free Officers, or Ba’thi movements in their aspirations to dislodge the ruling 
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From 2003 onward, Iraqi civilians endured a level of suffering unseen during any period in its 
history. As it neared its centennial, questions about Iraqi identity were still unanswered and its 
national icons reflected a mix of uncertainty and unpreparedness for the future. During the 2000s 
the gradual removal of Husseinian elements from the Iraq flag evidence a growing confidence to 
look beyond the memory of Saddam. The sudden emergence of the Islamic State thrust Iraqis 
back into warfare and many cities devolved into hellscapes under ISIS domination. Three years 
later, the Islamic State was destroyed in Iraq, but questions about national unity and identity 
remain open. Even in the midst of fighting the 2015, the Iraqi parliament was considering 
another flag modification to incorporate the ethnic subcomponents, one legislator saying , ‘“ We 
of course, wish like other nations that Iraq will be stable and have a national anthem and flag that 
unites all Iraqis with their diverse backgrounds…but I think that this very issue will be resolved 
when Iraqis reach stability, maybe after 10 years.’” 232   
 





Chapter 5. Conclusion 
Iraq underwent tremendous iconographic transformation during its first century of existence. 
Beginning in 1921, Iraq attempted to present itself as a post-Ottoman domain prepared to 
demonstrate its maturity and readiness for independence. During this period, Iraqi iconography 
emphasized Arab distinctiveness and connectivity to ancient Mesopotamia, while establishing a 
transhistorical link between medieval caliphates and the incipient Hashemite realm. Despite 
upheaval during the 1930s and 1940s, Iraqi iconography remained unchanged until removed by 
the Free Officers in 1959. Under Abd al-Karim Qasim, official symbols of state authority placed 
Mesopotamian symbolism into the forefront employing the sunburst of Shamash commingled 
with quasi-socialist heraldry. This inclination was subsumed under the Ba’thi Party which 
emphasized Pan-Arabism and under Saddam Hussein and added the takbir of Islam. While this 
feature remains into the present, Iraqis struggled to find an appropriate way to diminish 
Husseinian memory on vexillography without committing a sacrilegious defacement of God’s 
name. Finally, the suppression of the Islamic State in 2017 represented the opposite of Iraqi 
nationalism, a political energy which questioned the very reason for Iraqi existence in the first 
place.  
 The seven national flags and supporting heraldry represented a wide latitude between 
successive Iraqi governments, often tinkering with various notions of national identity. Between 
ethnic identity, transhistorical association, and aspirational values, governments used 
vexillography to inform its citizen of the direction Baghdad was headed. The public either opted 
to dwell within its newly assigned identity or rebel against its imposition, beginning the cycle 
anew. While new regimes endeavored to outclass previous administrations, they were beholden 
to parameters established in the preceding years. Hence, its successor regimes where typically 
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handcuffed by iconographic standards unforeseen during the revolutionary period. As the Iraqi 
public bonded with heraldic and vexillographic representation throughout the decades they 
became less likely to abandon them. The Shi’i troops which clashed with Islamic State fighters 
into 2017 did so under a flag bearing Saddam Hussein’s innovation, their sacrifice making a 
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